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30. BACKGROUND
Antecedents
In May 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Migration and Development Research 
Group (M&D) at Radboud University started to explore the possibilities for collaborating on the 
theme of international migration, which became an increasingly important policy theme in the 
course of the final decade of the last century, both in relation to the need to deal with questions of 
integration (how to deal with migrants in Dutch society), and, especially, in relation to efforts to 
incorporate migration issues as a new element in Dutch development cooperation, and also in 
anticipation of the participation of the Netherlands in the UN high-level dialogue on 14 and 15 
September 2006. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was aware of the increasing growth rate of the world's 
migrant population, acknowledged the need for a better understanding of the root causes of 
migration and the need to contribute to policy formulation for optimizing the link between 
(international) development and migration, in particular, for the countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
(and also from the perspective of achieving the millennium development goals). 
The M&D research group at the Radboud University, supported by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, elaborated a proposal for a joint project with the title ‘International migration 
and national development: Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin’, which 
was aimed at gaining a better understanding of the implications of international migration for 
national development from the perspective of the sending countries (with an emphasis on sub-
Saharan Africa). This project was started in May 2006, and aimed to gain a better understanding 
of the link between international migration and national development and to present policy 
recommendations on how to stimulate migration for development.
The project consisted of a number of research activities, including desk research, field 
missions and an international experts’ meeting, financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
was carried out with the active participation of policy makers. In the course of the process, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment also decided to participate and agreed to contribute to 
the project by co-financing activities. 
Purpose of the project
The purpose of the project is to explore (1) current perceptions - as seen from the perspective of 
the countries of origin - of the links between international migration and national development, 
and (2) current trends in policy making aimed at minimizing the negative effects, while 
optimizing the development impact. What are the dominant view and policy initiatives in the 
different countries of sub-Saharan Africa?
Various/ multi- faced angles and perspectives are explored with the help of the following 
questions: What is the sending countries’ view of the rapid out-migration of skilled and unskilled 
labour? What is the sending countries’ perception of the advantages and disadvantages of 
temporary and/or circular migration as against permanent migration? What is their perception of 
return migration and how is this linked to national development. What are the implications of 
international migration for national development and poverty reduction strategies (as reflected in 
PRSPs)? How is migration perceived from the regional perspective (ECOWAS, etc.) and what 
kind of initiatives are currently underway to optimise the development implications?
To what extent are sending countries actively involved in formulating migration policies; 
What kinds of efforts are currently made (by government and civil society) to overcome the 
4negative consequences of the brain drain and the shortage of human resources? What experiences 
do countries have in involving return migrants in development projects, co-development etc? 
How do countries respond to migrant recruitment practices? What are the current concerns with 
respect to the gender and generational aspects of migration and how are these responded to? 
What are the current bottlenecks in migration management and how could capacity building help 
to optimise the link with national development? How do sending countries deal with the issues of 
security and protection of migrants (at home and abroad) and with civil rights? 
What is the role of governments and migrant organisations in mobilizing knowledge and 
technology available in the diaspora towards the home country? What kind of agreements are 
currently signed between sending and receiving countries, and what are the implications for 
development? What bottlenecks are perceived and how could donors contribute to optimizing the 
link between international migration trends and national development? 
Most attention was paid during the project to Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Kenya and 
Nigeria, but some attention was also paid to a large number of other countries (Sudan, Somalia, 
Burundi, Cape Verde, Tanzania, Mali, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Zambia, Botswana, Congo and 
Ghana). During the project, interesting comparisons were made with relevant cases from other 
continents, e.g. the Philippines, China, India and Mexico.
Project activities and methodology
The project, consisting of desk research, field missions and an international experts’ meeting, was 
carried out between May and December 2006, and started with the following activities:
Desk research
· Inventory of policy documents/ state and donor policies with respect to international 
migration, including Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)
· Statistical analysis of migration streams, inventory of migration routes, with an emphasis 
on temporary/ circular migration; 
· Inventory of policy initiatives through a questionnaire distributed among the Dutch 
embassies in sub-Saharan Africa;
· Interviewing migrant and diaspora organisations related to sub-Saharan Africa operating 
in the Netherlands.
Additional data collection took place during field missions to Nigeria, Senegal, Burkina Faso, 
Rwanda and Kenya (between June and September 2006). During these missions emphasis was 
placed on local perceptions and current policy initiatives relating to international migration. 
Finally, we organised an International Experts’ meeting in collaboration with the Human 
Resources Development Centre (Lagos, Nigeria) which took place on 23-24 August at the 
Radboud University. This brought together an international group of scholars and policy makers 
from sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America and Europe. Their written contributions and 
the discussions generated relevant information about perceptions and policies (see Adepoju, van 
Naerssen and Zoomers [2006]). The proceedings of this meeting were used as an input to the 
Dutch contribution to the-high level dialogue on Migration and Development on September 14-
15 in New York.
The present Report aims to give an overall overview of the complete output of the project. 
For a complete overview of the project output, see the Working Paper Series Migration and 
5Development (reports 1-14). These reports are available on the websites of the Radboud 
University and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.minbuza.nl). 
Project team
The project was carried out under the coordination of Prof. Annelies Zoomers (CEDLA, 
Radboud University) and Dr. Ton van Naerssen (Radboud University), and involved an 
international and multidisciplinary team of researchers (geography, anthropology, economics, 
demography) affiliated to various institutions. 
More specifically, the following persons were actively involved in the various activities:
· 5 junior researchers (Joep Kusters, David van Moppes, Roald Plug, Joris Schapendonk, 
Marleen van der Veen, Radboud University) (Desk research/ interviewing migrant and 
diaspora organisations, and organisation of the experts’ meeting)
· Prof. Aderanti Adepoju (Human Resources Development Centre; Lagos, Nigeria); co-
organiser of experts’ meeting.
· Dr. Annelet Broekhuis (IDS, UU, Utrecht) Field missions to Burkina Faso and Senegal 
(the latter in collaboration with Babacar Ndione)
· Prof. Leo de Haan (ASC, Leiden) Resource person (experts’ meeting)
· Dr. Hein de Haas (Oxford University, Oxford) Field mission to Nigeria (in collaboration 
with Jean Munro)
· Dieudonné Muhoza and Pierre Claver Rutayisire (Utrecht University) Field mission to 
Rwanda.
· Dr. Ton van Naerssen (Radboud University) Desk research (migration and diaspora 
organisations)
· Dr. Marcel Rutten (ASC, Leiden) Field mission to Kenya (in collaboration with Koki 
Muli).
· Dr. Ernst Spaan (NIDI, The Hague) Desk research
· Prof. Annelies Zoomers (CEDLA/ Radboud University), co-organiser of experts’ meeting 
and general coordination of desk research and field missions.
This team worked in close collaboration with Marjan Wind (SPL), Marieke van Renssen (DPV), 
Desirée Ooft (SPL) based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Jan Verboom (Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment). During the project, we discussed the preliminary results at 
working meetings. Policy makers participated actively during the experts’ meeting. The final 
results were presented and discussed during a lunch lecture at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
November 21 2006. This meeting was attended by over 100 policy makers from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministries of Justice and 
Economic Affairs, and other institutions (OIM, ICCO etc.). 
61. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RESULTS 
1. Introduction
This project focuses on achieving a better understanding of the implications of international 
migration for national development from the perspective of the sending countries (with an 
emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa). More specifically, it is concerned with the question of how a 
coherent international migration policy can contribute to the fight against poverty.
For a long time policy makers paid little attention to migration. The most attention in 
development cooperation was paid to the encouragement of local development and, where 
attention was paid to migration it was generally viewed as the opposite pole to development: 
outmigration was regarded as an expression of poverty and development projects were intended 
to contribute to the reduction of outmigration.
This situation has recently changed. There are various reasons why international 
migration is now high on the agenda. On the one hand, it is a consequence of increasing problems 
with the multicultural society in the receiving area, combined with a fear of invasion. On 1 
September 2006 the website of the Algemeen Persbureau (AP) carried the report: There seems to 
be no end to the explosion of migrants from Africa. In the past two days over 800 migrants have 
arrived in the Canary Isles. 9,000 have already been intercepted in 2006. In August their number 
was higher than in the whole of 2005. There is an increasing impression that migrants are 
streaming in from all sides and that there is a growing need to check migration flows. Whereas 
the emphasis was initially placed on restrictive (and anti-migrant) policies, there now appears to 
be a shift towards selective policies (including circular migration): because of the increasing 
ageing of the population in the receiving countries, there is a growing realisation that a call will 
have to be made in the not too distant future on migrant labour.
Another, more positive, reason why more attention has recently been paid to migration is 
the growing conviction that international migration cannot be seen in isolation from 
development, and that, with the right policies, an important contribution can be made to 
development1. 
With regard to the question of whether international migration can or cannot contribute to 
sustainable development and combating poverty there are at present two opposing views2. 
According to the optimists, international migration offers good possibilities. They point in the 
first place to the remittances which are seen as a new or additional source of finance for 
development. According to estimates by the World Bank (2006), these remittances amounted to 
no less than 167,000 million dollars3. They are estimated to benefit some 500 million people, or 8 
percent of the world population. The amount is greater than the official development aid. 
According to Adams & Page (2003), through remittances, migration has a direct effect on the 
reduction of poverty: an increase of 10 per cent in a country’s share of international migrants 
leads to a 2 percent decline in 1$ a day poverty4. In addition to the financial remittances, a 
positive value is also attributed to the social transfers (the flow of information and ideas): 
  
1 The World Bank (2003) put emphasis on  importance of  remittances and played an important role in stimulating 
the debate on migration and development  by the organisation of several conferences, together with DFID (UK).  
2 de Haas 2003; de Haan 2005.
3 World Bank 2006.
4 Adams & Page 2003; in de Haan 2005:2. 
7countries of origin are said to be able to benefit from brain gain, not to mention the positive 
effects of return migration. Migration is viewed as positive factor, because it leads to a balance 
on the labour market5 and because international labour migration is expected to contribute to the 
banishment of inequality and to lead to a better distribution of the advantages of globalisation. 
Migration impacts positively upon all stakeholders, as evidenced by the fact that sending 
countries and the migrants themselves benefit, because migrants find jobs, develop their skills, 
earn some money and remit part of it to their countries of origin, while destination countries 
benefit from the skills and labour they receive from migrants.
Alongside these there is a group of pessimists who particularly emphasise a number of 
negative aspects and threatening dangers. They point to the fact that international migration can 
lead to conflicts in the host countries, but also stress particularly the negative consequences for 
the areas of origin, especially the loss of labour and intellect. They point out that it is generally 
the best and the brightest, the young, able-bodied people who leave first. Where migrants do 
decide to return to their home country, this is mainly a reflection of failure. Return migrants are 
likely to be the old, sick and unsuccessful and skills brought back are unlikely to be of much 
help6. The poorest with the worst training and the disabled without networks therefore remain 
behind and those who fail are the first to return. This has unavoidable negative effects in the 
sending region. To the extent that these are compensated by money transfers, a high measure of 
dependency is created, while conflicts can easily arise between migrants and non-migrants, and 
undesirable patterns of regional inequality. 
Although there are therefore opposing views, a growing consensus is now emerging that 
although international migration does not automatically lead to favourable effects, it can 
contribute to development and poverty reduction provided an appropriate and consistent policy is 
pursued7. International organisations (UN, IOM, ILO etc.) and national governments of 
numerous countries are now actively involved in optimizing the link between international 
migration and national development. There are many different initiatives aimed at streamlining 
international migration and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and 
governments of sending and receiving countries are increasingly involved in streamlining their 
attempts in managing migration in the right directions. 
However, much of what is happening today is taking place on the initiative of the 
receiving countries, and is dominated by the wish to control or restrict migration and to protect 
their borders. Little is known about how governments in the sending countries perceive 
migration, whether they see international migration as a positive or negative force in their attempt 
to achieve national development, and about what kind of policy initiatives are currently taken to 
optimise the development impact while restricting the negative consequences.
Before presenting the local views and policy initiatives, we will first provide the necessary 
information about the characteristics of migration (2) and recent trends (3), as an essential basis 
for further analysis.
  
5 Jones 1992: in Mafukidze 2006:105 
6 de Haan 2005.
7 UNFPA 2004.
82. The characteristics of international labour migration: towards a typology
This research project has focused in particular on international labour migration (the movement 
of persons, i.e. non-nationals or foreigners, across national borders for purposes other than travel 
or short-term residence8). Little attention will be paid to other groups, such as refugees, 
internationally displaced persons and/or asylum seekers9 although it is difficult in practice to 
make a clear division10.
The number of international labour migrants is currently estimated at between 175 and 
200 million11, about 3 percent of the world population. If we try to obtain a picture of the 
direction of the international migration flows, we find that there is a limited number of dominant 
destinations, i.e. the classical immigration countries (the United States [US] and Canada), a 
number of countries on the Persian Gulf (such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Emirates) and, lastly, a number of European countries (France, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Spain and Italy). Viewed from a distance, migration streams seem to flow from the 
poor south towards the richer northern countries, although there are considerable differences in 
the type of migration and the opportunities for integration and upward mobility. 
· -The US/Canada.
The migration flows to the United States and Canada derive - as one might expect –
mainly from Mexico and the Caribbean (over 20 million Mexicans and Cubans live and 
work in de US), although there has recently also been a marked growth in the migration 
of highly skilled people from China and India. After the granting of the H1 visa, migrants 
can quite easily settle with their families and, as long as they have work, there is a good 
possibility that the visa will be extended.
· -Gulf states (such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates) and 
the Middle East.
The flow of migration to the region of the Persian Gulf originates mainly from South and 
Southeast Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand), but also increasingly from North, Central and East Africa. It consists mainly of 
the temporary labour migration of unskilled men, but increasingly also of other groups, 
for example, a growing migration by women, particularly from Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Sri Lanka. In addition, Saudi Arabia searches in countries such as Nigeria and Ghana 
for highly-skilled labour (female nurses and doctors). Recruitment takes place mainly 
among Moslem populations, and there is a considerable flow of Somalis and Ethiopians 
across the Gulf of Aden to the Middle East (van Moppes 2006). There is now also 
migration from West Africa (Burkina Faso) to the Gulf States (Broekhuis 2006). There is 
no possibility of visa extension in the Gulf States, so that each time a migrant’s contract 
expires, he/she has to leave the country. There are therefore no opportunities to settle 
permanently and migrants enjoy no right of family reunification. Recently, the growing 
presence of foreign labour appears to be leading increasingly to problems, especially in 
  
8 Messina & Lahav 2006: 1.
9 Skeldon 1990; Mafukidze 2006:104
10 This section, and the analysis which follows is based on Zoomers 2006
11 GCIM 2005; Farrant et al 2006.
9relation to worker’s rights, e.g. in wages, education and health, as demanded in the free 
trade agreement negotiations (Rutten 2006: 24). 
· -EU (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy). 
A large part of the migration flows to countries of the European Union (EU) derives from 
North Africa and Turkey and is a direct consequence of migrant worker programmes (up 
to 1974) and the subsequent family reunification12. After a period in which immigration 
was largely determined by refugees and asylum seekers, the EU has recently been 
confronted with migrant flows from sub-Saharan Africa (especially Nigeria 72,000; 
Senegal, 77,000 and Cape Verde 43,000), Asia and Latin America. Most of the migrants 
enter via Spain and Italy (once emigration countries themselves), but the influence of the 
colonial past and/or cultural ties appears clearly in the ultimate division of the migrants 
over the different EU countries: West African migrants go mainly to France; Latin 
Americans migrate relatively frequently to Italy and Spain; and Asians migrate 
proportionately rather more to the United Kingdom. The Netherlands plays relatively only 
a modest role as a migration destination. The majority of EU countries occupy an 
intermediate position in comparison with the US/ Canada and the Gulf States. Where 
restrictive policies are operated, possibilities exist for family reunification and settlement; 
each country employs different definitions and pursues a different policy. The situation is 
heterogeneous as far as the circumstances of migrants (including integration and 
deportation policies) are concerned.
Viewed from the receiving countries, - there therefore appears to be, at first sight, a relatively 
comprehensible situation in which globalisation has been translated into a worldwide migration 
system with richer receiving regions (receiving countries), on the one side, and poorer sending 
countries (countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America), on the other side. Thus from the 
perspective of the receiving regions there appears to be a situation in which the migration flows 
follow a relatively fixed pattern. An international migration system generally includes a core 
receiving region, which may be a country or group of countries, and a set of specific sending 
countries linked to it by unusually large flows of immigrants13. These migration flows are often 
matched by a reversed flow of remittances.
If we look at international migration from the perspective of the sending countries, 
however, a different - more diverse - picture emerges (Zoomers 2006). The majority of migration 
flows are found not to be directed towards the core receiving countries just referred to. Only a 
limited number of countries are characterised by South-North migration. By far the majority of 
emigration countries are found to be the subject of South-South migration; in other instances we 
encounter diasporic states (states with a large migrant population fanning out over many 
countries). 
South-North Migration
Examples of countries with South-North migration directed at one of the above core regions 
include Mexico (to the US); Morocco (to France, Germany etc.); Senegal (to France or Spain);
and/or Ecuador (Spain). It concerns a limited group of countries with a clearly structured flow 
  
12 Lucas 2004: 5.
13 Fawcett 1989, Zlotnik 1992.
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towards specific receiving countries with, in the case of the EU, the majority of the migrants 
entering via Spain and Italy, and/or settling in the former mother country (colonial ties)14. 
Countries with directed South-North migration enjoy the advantage that -thanks to migration-
they have been able to strengthen their negotiating position with EU countries and gain access to 
additional resources15. Negotiations increasingly take place between the sending and receiving 
countries (readmission and migrant quotas). Historical ties are selectively re-established. 
Compared with other countries, they sit close to the fire and are able to benefit from new, as yet 
modest, work opportunities in the core regions. The migration puts them in the picture.
What is interesting or, rather, problematical is the fact that these countries with strong 
South-North migration (such as Senegal, Morocco etc.) – but also diasporic states like Kenya or 
Nigeria (see below) - are often seen in their own region as interesting destination and/or transition 
areas, and perform an important function as reception areas for South-South migration (see 
below). In order to satisfy the demands imposed by the northern countries (admission and 
deportation policies), these countries are often constrained to act more stringently against the 
inflow from their neighbours. Mexico, for example, is obliged by the US to keep its southern 
border closed and to act against illegal immigrants, which has immediately negative 
consequences for intraregional relations and is also at odds with the striving for free mobility 
within the region (Ecowas, AU, Mercosur etc.). In order to qualify for legal migrant places, many 
of these countries are required to seal their borders hermetically and to act more stringently 
against illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries. In this sense, many of these countries 
have a northern agenda.
European states seek Nigeria’s collaboration in the readmission of undocumented migrants or rejected asylum 
seekers. Nigeria is known as one of the most cooperative African states on this issue and has readmission deals with 
Italy, Spain, Ireland and Switzerland. Nigeria has asked for immigration quotas in exchange for collaboration in 
readmissions. Nigeria is rather willing to cooperate in increasing border control and readmission (de Haas 2006).
Since European countries have started to put pressure on Nigeria to collaborate with readmission policies, the 
Nigerian state appears to have begun more active emigration policies by negotiating immigrant quotas in exchange 
for collaboration (Nigeria’s own immigration policies are rather restrictive - most non-ecowas foreigners have to 
obtain a visa to come to Nigeria (de Haas 2006).
Pressure from the European side and their more rigid immigration legislation, however, are forcing the African states 
to manage their migration flow more strictly and also to implement decisions formulated in many sub-regional 
(ECOWAS, UEMOA) conventions and agreements (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006: 10).
South-South Migration
In many countries - notably in sub-Saharan Africa – there is mainly South-South migration. 
These are often relatively poor (landlocked) countries. Examples include Burkina Faso, Mali and 
Niger (with migration to Ivory Coast, but also towards Nigeria and Senegal); Lesotho and 
Mozambique (with migration to South Africa and Botswana); and Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Burundi, Congo and Rwanda, where continuing conflicts have caused a large part of the 
  
14 Other examples of countries with important South North migration are Kenya and Nigeria; but given the dispersal 
of the population ‘overseas’ we decided to classify these countries as diasporic states (see below). 
15 Where international organisations (such as OIM, ILO etc.) are currently undertaking initiatives to increase the 
development effect of migration (reduction of transaction costs of remittances; encouragement of brain gain/ 
limitation of brain drain etc.; combating illegality etc. (programmes such as MIDA, TOKTEN etc.) these are often 
highly concentrated in countries with south-north migration.
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population to seek refuge in the neighbouring countries (e.g. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). In 
Latin America examples include such countries as Paraguay and Bolivia, from where, until 
recently, large numbers emigrated to Argentina; Nicaragua (with migration to Costa Rica); and 
Honduras (mainly migration to Mexico). Asian examples are Indonesia (with a population of 
more than one million in Malaysia) and Myanmar (with one million living in Thailand). There is 
also considerable migration from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam to 
destinations within the region16. 
A high proportion of the migrants being discussed here have a relatively bad time in the 
receiving countries. Compared with migration to the northern countries, the possibilities for 
earning remittances are often limited in south-south migration. People migrate on a temporary 
basis in order to earn a supplementary income in the event of a crisis (circular migration); they 
often do not have the necessary documents, are illegal and have generally to be content with low-
paid work (sometimes they take up the places left by the emigration of the country’s own 
population), or the migration is of the type known as “eat away” migration (see Broekhuis 2006 
for the situation in Burkina Faso). Migrants enjoy very little protection, either by their own 
government, or by the government in the receiving country, and cases of disguised slavery are 
regularly found (such as recently in Argentina, when it was discovered how a business treated 
Bolivian migrants). Migrants are often the victims of discrimination and xenophobia - even in 
their own region - (as recently in Ivory Coast, but also in Botswana, Argentina and South Africa). 
The migrant population is sent back with great regularity from the neighbouring countries to the 
country of origin (as happened with the Burkinabé from Ivory Coast and the Ghanaians from 
Nigeria). Many Bolivians and Paraguayans have also returned from Argentina to their own 
countries as a consequence of the economic crisis (Zoomers 2006).
Diasporic States (countries with a huge and dispersed overseas population, with a large 
number of expatriates)
The migrants originating from diasporic states are by far the most numerous. As a result of 
outmigration over a long time covering several generations, a substantial part of the population 
(including the elite) has now become dispersed over a large number of countries throughout the 
world. The numbers involved are impressive (in any event many times greater than the flow of 
south-north migration)17. The Asian diaspora is estimated at more than 70 million. The largest is 
the Chinese diaspora - over 35 million (widely dispersed over South East Asia, but also the rest 
of the world). The figure for India is 20 million, that for the Philippines over 7 million, and Korea 
has a diaspora of over 3.5 million. Other examples are Malaysia with a diaspora of 5 million, 
Vietnam (1 million) and Pakistan. The Latin American diaspora is estimated at over 25 million. If 
we ignore Mexico and the Caribbean (which are oriented mainly on the US) and Argentina and 
Ecuador (relatively strongly oriented on Italy and Spain), we find that the countries mainly 
concerned are Colombia, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela, from where a group of over 8 million has 
fanned out over a large number of countries: not only the US, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, 
Italy, Israel and Japan, but also over the neighbouring countries18. African examples of diasporic 
  
16 Lucas 2004: 4.
17 This diaspora also includes refugees and is partly composed of south -south migrants.
18 Germana 2005.
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states are South Africa, Nigeria19 and Kenya, but also on a more modest scale smaller countries 
such as Ghana, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia and the Cape Verde islands20. 
In contrast to the group of South-South migrants described above, these migrants 
relatively often constitute a well-off elite, including a considerable group of transnational 
entrepreneurs21. In a growing number of countries (including China, the Philippines and India22) 
the national government is pursuing an active policy to involve the diaspora in the national 
development. In many countries, however, policy in this field has not yet crystallised out so 
clearly. Although it is customary to speak of migrants, we are referring here to what is often a 
consolidated group of well-to-do expatriates, the majority of whom have lived for many years 
outside their own countries, in some instances even for several generations, and many have 
succeeded in building up a successful new livelihood in the receiving country. Many countries 
have very little information about their diaspora and it is only relatively recently that the diaspora 
has been seen by governments as development potential (Adepoju, van Naerssen and Zoomers 
2006).
The above classification makes clear that, where migration is concerned, it is no longer sufficient 
to divide the world into origin and destination regions and to connect the two groups with arrows 
to indicate the migrant and capital flows. There is a wide variety of ways in which countries are 
incorporated into the migration system. This has direct consequences for the possibilities of being 
able to profit from migration. Diasporic states and countries with directed South-North migration 
generally find themselves in a relatively favourable position, while the countries with south-south 
migration appear to be increasingly faced with fresh restrictions.
The most favourable are the circumstances of the diasporic states: thanks to migration 
over many generations, they can call on a considerable overseas population which they can use as 
development potential. They have not so much to suffer under restrictive policies; the majority of 
the migrants are already living in the reception region and are, more or less, successfully 
integrated, so that they have relatively good possibilities for investment. Countries with South-
North migration enjoy the advantage that they are clearly in the picture and can relatively easily 
negotiate about projects, readmission or migrant quotas. They sit close to the fire compared with 
other countries and so are able to profit from temporary requirements for migrant labour.
This stands in contrast to the countries with mainly South-South migration, which are 
largely at the mercy of the policy of receiving countries in their own region (often therefore 
neighbouring countries), where conflicts are relatively quickly translated into inter-state 
problems; where problems of discrimination or xenophobia (which also arise in the north) remain 
relatively invisible, because the media pay attention mainly to tensions in the northern countries.
  
19 Nigeria plays a key role in African migration (the country has 140 million inhabitants). It is an example of an 
important emigration country (of the type diasporic state with a considerable diaspora in the EU [UK and the US]), 
but also important populations in South Africa and the Gulf states. The expatriate population is relatively well-
educated and established. At the same time, it is an important destination and transit area for the neighbouring states, 
and an important member of ECOWAS and the AU. Nigeria was for a long period an immigration country, but is 
now characterised by emigration to Ghana and Cameroon, Gabon, Botswana and South Africa (de Haas 2006)
20 Sheffer 2003: 104-105.
21 Van Naerssen, Spaan, Hillmann 2005.
22 This is also the case in Mexico which was mentioned as a country with South-North migration.
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3. Migration routes from sub-Saharan Africa and recent trends 
The heterogeneity of migration finds expression in a great variety of migration routes. Because of 
rapid changes in the volume and direction of migration there is a growing complexity which is 
difficult to capture in a typology of migration countries.
If we analyse the dominant migration routes from sub-Saharan Africa to Fortress Europe (van 
Moppes 2006), just as the route through Mexico is the main route for most Latin American 
migrants on their way to the United States, there is a restricted number of gateways towards the 
EU. There are currently six main routes from sub-Saharan Africa, leading to three major 
departure areas (van Moppes 2006): 
· A large stretch of Africa’s west coast, including northern Mauritania (notably 
Nouadhibou), Western Sahara and southern Morocco. The Canary Islands, especially 
Fuerteventura, are the main destination for migrants arriving from these areas. 
· Northern Morocco. In this area are located the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, 
which form direct destinations on the African continent. In addition, the northern and 
north-western shores of Morocco are the main departure areas for small boats heading 
toward the Spanish mainland, notably Andalusia.
· The Tunisian east coast and western parts of the Libyan coast. From these shores the 
boats head for Italy (Lampedusa, Sicily), or Malta, and/or further north.
The Spanish and Italian territories in and near Africa are thus the main destinations on the way to 
the EU. After all, arriving on one of these territories means actually landing in the European 
Union, which opens up a broad range of possibilities of other countries to go to. However, before 
migrants actually arrive in departure areas like airports, seaports and the coasts of different 
African countries, they have usually been on a long journey on the African continent in order 
actually to get there (see van Moppes 2006; also Spaan and van Moppes 2006). Migration 
destinations are to a large extent determined by historical factors (colonial ties) and there is some 
degree of consolidation. Migration patterns, however, are becoming increasingly less transparent 
and are rapidly changing; radical changes have recently occurred in the direction and volume of 
migration.
In the first place a reversal of migration has occurred in many countries: former 
emigration countries, such as Spain or Italy, and also Botswana (Gwebu 2006), now act as both 
immigration and transition areas. Other examples are Nigeria and Kenya, which have developed 
from immigration into emigration areas (often in combination with assuming a role as a transit 
area (de Haas 2006; Rutten 2006). An increasing number of countries are affected not only by 
emigration or immigration, but are also the subject of both at the same time (e.g., Morocco). 
Another example is Senegal: c. 2 million Senegalese abroad (France, Gabon and Ivory Coast), 
but at the same time the number of foreigners in the country is estimated at 800,000 (Broekhuis 
and Ndione 2006). Countries such as Rwanda, Kenya and Senegal increasingly act as transit 
areas: 
Transit areas
Rwanda:
Comme pays de transit, le Rwanda, grâce à l’Aeroport international de Kanombe, est une voie de transit pour les 
populations de l’est du Congo et des Burundais qui vont en Europe, en Amérique et en Asie, car l’aeroport de 
Kanombe est desservi directement ou indirectement par des grandes compagnies internationales (SN Brussels, 
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KLM), parfois via Nairobi. De même, la plupart des marchandises en provenance des ports de Mombassa et de Dar 
Es-salaam, principaux ports de l’Afrique orientale, transitent par le réseau routier Rwandais (Muhoza and Rutayisire 
2006: 4). 
Kenya:
Kenya is a transit country for Ethiopia, Rwandans, Somalis, Eritreans and Asians. Our borders are porous, which 
makes it easy to sneak in and out of the country Most people do not move through Jomo Kenyatta Airport, although 
it is the hub for East Africa and beyond. They simply pass over country towards the border and leave public and 
private transport some 5 km before the border town. With the help of agents they cross the border and in this way get 
reach as far as South Africa (Rutten 2006:17). Transit is mainly from Somalia as a refugee to Kenya and then abroad 
for labour (Rutten 2006: 18). Many of the illegal transit migrants discovered were of Asian origin (Chinese, 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi passports) (Rutten 2006)
Senegal:
Dakar est un pôle de transit des réseaux illicites de migrants en provenance des pays africains (Nigeria notamment) 
et de certains pays asiatiques (Inde, Chine et Bengladesh par exemple23). Le nombre de pays touchés par ce 
phénoméne augmente rapidement, les routes du trafic se multiplient et se ramifient pour constituer des itinéraires de 
plus and plus complexes, et la participation de réseaux criminels organisés sur les plans transnational et local, and 
violation flagrante des normes nationales et internationales, est désormais répandue (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006: 
8).
As a direct consequence of restrictive policies in the core regions (i.e., EU, US etc.) new 
transition zones and more specific migration hubs have arisen between the place of origin and the 
place of destination (van Moppes 2006). Cities along the Sahara route, or places with direct boat 
and flight connection are attractive locations for people specializing in the migration business. 
Examples of important transition cities - where people stay temporarily to earn money - include 
Agadez (Niger), Bamako (Mali) and Tamanrasset (southern Algeria). Other examples of 
important migration hubs include Accra (Ghana); Banjul (The Gambia); Casablanca (Morocco); 
Dakar (Senegal); Ndjamena (Chad); Douala (Cameroon); Freetown (Sierra Leone); Tripoli 
(Libya); and Sal (Cape Verde). Finally, the cities of Lagos (Nigeria), Abidjan (Ivory Coast), 
Cotonou (Benin), and especially the capital of Guinea, Conakry, are named as places where travel 
documents can be easily forged, or where one can buy stolen travel documents (van Moppes 
2006).
Migrants are confronted with rising costs and are forced to earn extra money on the way 
(en route to Europe or the US) in order to finance the last part of their journey. Many continue to 
linger en route, having rid themselves of their old identity, and remain temporarily at an 
intermediate location as quasi-migrants. They have been forced to break off the journey en route, 
but can often not go back, because they are afraid of loss of face or are unable to face repaying 
the sum that relatives and friends helped to advance24. The migrants often find themselves in poor 
circumstances particularly in the transition zones. These groups are extremely vulnerable to 
exploitation25. This refers especially to North Africa.
  
23 Netherlands Embassy, Dakar (2005) Illegal migration in West Africa, with detailed study of Senegal and 
Mauritania. 
24 Traditionally the decision for (international) migration rested with the family: the family decided which member 
should go (in accordance with the theory of the new economics of labour migration). Nowadays migration can also 
be an individual decision (Broekhuis 2006). 
25 Collyer 2006: 145.
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Transit migration
The difficulties of this final stage of their journey into Europe was what kept them in Morocco. When we asked what 
he needed to reach Europe, one Nigerian migrant replied: money, it is only money. Money or papers, but who’s to 
give you papers without money? Some people have friends in Europe who will take the risk and send them their 
papers, then they just get on the boat, no problem, but that is very rare. No, it’s only money. Most migrants are very 
well aware of the costs of the various means of reaching Europe and could rattle off a price list. One Nigerian 
women explained the full costs: by air, 3500 Euro, that’s the diplomats’ route; you get the passport and safe passage 
at the airport. By ferry, 2200 euro, that’s the normal passenger service. A Zodiac across from Tangiers is 1200 Euro; 
entry into Ceuta is the same, then Las Palmas is 800 Euro (Collyer 2006: 243).
Restrictive policy (in the US, Europe, but also with the migrants’ own region26) has led to an 
increasing diversity of origin and destination areas. For example, the migration from Nigeria to 
EU was initially directed at the UK, but more recently, an increasing number of Nigerians have 
migrated to countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium as well as the Gulf 
states. In the 1990s, Spain, Italy and Ireland emerged as new major destinations of labour 
migrants from West Africa (cf. Black et al. 2004:9; in de Haas 2006:3). Migrants from Kenya 
(originally focusing on South Africa, UK and USA), nowadays also migrate not only to the Gulf 
states (lowly skilled labour), and the Middle East, but also to Germany (Rutten 2006). The 
Burkinabé (inhabitants of Burkina Faso, referred to above as a country with predominantly 
South-South migration) are also migrating increasingly to Italy. The Bolivians, who for a long 
time migrated to Argentina in search of work, are now migrating in large numbers to Spain. 
There is also increasing intercontinental migration within the south (e.g. Chinese who migrate to 
Europe or the US via Kenya). Where previously, migration preferably took place along the more 
or less well-known routes, travel now preferably takes place to conventional destinations in order 
to evade tightened border controls as far as possible. 
Along with more restrictive policies, there seems to be a rapid increase in human 
trafficking and illegality. According to de Haas (2006:3) in Nigeria, increasing restrictions and 
controls on immigration in Europe have not led to a decrease in emigration rates. Rather, 
migrants are more often undocumented and the itineraries tend to be longer and more perilous. 
According to a recent study on Kano State, traffickers successfully exploited the annual 
pilgrimage to Mecca to traffic children, men and women for different exploitative purposes e.g. 
prostitution, begging and all forms of domestic work (cf. Ehindero et al. 2006; in de Haas 2006: 
4). This has made Nigerian migrants more vulnerable to exploitation and marginalisation. It has 
also made migration more permanent, because people no longer take the risk of leaving (de Haas 
2006). 
Human trafficking: examples from Nigeria
In the early 1990, immigration restrictions made prospective emigrants increasingly dependent on large loans in 
order to pay for their journey. This provided an opportunity for traffickers, who enticed young women to migrate 
with promises of good jobs, and subsequently coerced them into prostitution to repay their migration debt (Carling 
2005; in de Haas 2006:4). The initial contact with the traffickers is often made through a relative, friend, or other 
familiar person, who puts her in contact with a madam who organises and finances the journey. The costs may range 
from US$40,000 to US$100,000. The migrants and the madam conclude a pact, which is religiously sealed by a 
traditional priest, which obliges repayment in exchange for a safe passage to Europe (Carling 2005). After repaying 
their debt in one to three years, women are basically free, and it is fairly common for them to become a supervisor of 
other prostitutes and, eventually, a madam themselves (de Haas 2006: 4).
  
26 Examples of countries with a restrictive migration policy within sub-Saharan Africa are Nigeria, Kenya, South 
Africa and Botswana; there seems to be a tendency to restrict or at least control immigration. 
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The main source, transit, and destination countries for trafficked women and children in West Africa are Ghana, 
Nigeria and Senegal, but almost every country in West Africa seems to be involved in the trafficking networks. 
Other source countries include Benin, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Mauritania, whereas 
Ivory Coast, Niger, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo are countries that mainly import women and children. 
Trafficked children are usually recruited to work as domestic servants, in the informal sector, or into agricultural 
work on plantations. However, they can also be sold into slave labour, as in Sudan and Mauritania, or forced to 
become sex slaves to rebel commanders or affluent men, in Sudan or the Gulf States. Many women are forced into 
the prostitution or pornography business, and end up in other West African countries, or in the Gulf States or Europe. 
Destination countries include Gabon, South Africa, and Ivory Coast; Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Lebanon; Germany, Netherlands, UK, Italy, Spain and France. The trafficking networks are, however, so 
complicated that most West African countries are simultaneously source, transit and destination countries for 
trafficking women and children (de Haas 2006: 25). 
In reaction to the restrictive policies, changes have occurred in the manner of travel. Compared 
with previously, people now travel less often by air (that is reserved to the relatively well-to-do 
and to those travelling as tourists or students). Less well-off migrants preferably travel overland 
(cheap) or by boat (they cannot be immediately sent back) (van Moppes 2006). Nigeria forms an 
example: Whereas labour migration and trafficking to Europe used to predominantly use air 
links, visa requirements and increasing immigration controls at air and seaports, seem to have led 
to an increasing reliance on trans-Saharan, overland routes to the Maghreb countries, and in 
particular Morocco, from where Nigerians and other sub-Saharan Africans attempt to cross the 
Mediterranean Sea to southern Europe or the Atlantic Ocean to the Canary Islands (de Haas 
2006). From Senegal, too, migrants originally travelled mainly by air and now increasingly by 
boat (if necessary, via Mauritania). The Journal Nouvel Horizon de Dakar27 gives an appropriate 
summary of the situation: ‘Après avoir utilisé l’avion, le bateau, le chemin hasardeux des 
caravanes sahariennes, la traverse suicidaire du détroit de Gibraltar, les barbeles de Ceuta et de 
Melilla, il ne reste plus que la voie la plus directe: la mer, et le moyen de transport le plus 
inattendu: la pirogue’ (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006:5).
Important changes have recently also occurred in the composition of the migrant flows. 
Whereas migration was for a long time a matter for men, now it is increasingly women who take 
the plunge, whether or not accompanied by their family. Significant portions of females now 
migrate independently to fulfil their own economic needs (Adepoju 2002: 7 ; in Moppes 2006)28. 
Their proportion is currently estimated at over 50 percent29. As a result, radical changes are 
occurring not only in the division of roles between men and women and in parenthood in general, 
but also in relations between the generations. In the case of migration the grandparents often play 
an important role in bringing up the children who remain behind. Increasingly, however, it is also 
the children themselves who decide to migrate, even before they have completed their schooling. 
Thus there is not only feminisation, but also rejuvenation of migration flows (Adepoju, van 
Naerssen and Zoomers 2006). 
Lastly, changes have occurred in the occupations and level of skill of migrants. While, 
formerly, many migrants were wage earners, now a considerable proportion consists of self-
employed entrepreneurs. As a result of recruitment (by universities and companies), there appears 
to be a shift towards higher skilled migrants, although a large proportion still consists of poorly 
skilled ones (van Moppes 2006). The heterogeneity of the migrant population can be illustrated 
drawing on the example of Nigeria (de Haas 2006): There is circumstantial evidence that more 
  
27 Courrier International n 814 du 8 au 14 juin 2006, page 38.
28 In previous times, a relatively larger share of  women migrated for reasons of family reunion. 
29 UNFPA 2006; and Usher 2005.
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recent migrants to continental European countries are less skilled on average, and that they more 
often work in the (formal and, particularly in southern Europe, informal) service, trade and 
agricultural sectors of the economy. The UK and, in particular, the US (through student and 
professional migration as well as the Green Card lottery) generally continue to attract the 
relatively higher skilled workers30. The Gulf states have also started to attract the relatively 
highly skilled (in addition to the low-skilled labour).
In Burkina Faso, inter-continental and intra-continental migration have to be seen as two different strategic 
household decisions. Households with intercontinental migrants belong to the relatively wealthiest socio-economic 
group and migration to Europe is part of their wealth accumulation strategy. These households were able to deal with 
entry barriers linked with capital-intensive economic activities. However, a change from traditional to modern food 
production systems and to modern cropping patterns did not occur. 
Households involved in intra-continental migration, on the contrary, have access to less livelihood capital and their 
migration decision is a response to push factors. For this group, migration has to be understood as part of a 
consolidation or survival strategy. Eat away migration is part of the way they save on household expenses 
(Broekhuis 2006:7). 
In general, international migration from Burkina Faso is said to be temporary, partly circular. It can be concluded 
from the large numbers of Burkinabé who remained for some generations in Ghana and Ivory Coast that this 
assertion does not always hold31. However, the (...) survey showed that the young men who migrated to Ivory Coast 
were indeed circular migrants. These migrants were preponderantly young men without education, who worked 
before they left for the neighbouring country. They stayed abroad for an average of two years before returning to 
their home village. Over time the village of origin lost much of its importance as a destination for returnees32. 
Migrants to other countries had more often an urban background and were unemployed before their departure33
(Broekhuis 2006: 8).
Compared with earlier times people are now much better able to bridge great distances in a short 
time and to maintain intensive contact with the area of origin. In a certain sense the world has 
shrunk. Where travel formerly meant years of absence, today’s migrants can travel quickly and 
maintain contacts with several places at the same time. Migration is increasingly transnational 
and consists of an ongoing series of cross-border movements in which immigrants develop and 
maintain numerous economic, social and cultural links in more than one nation34. In the case of 
transnationality people find themselves neither here nor there: they find themselves in several 
places at the same time, as it were, and try to make strategic use of the differences which exist 
between countries35. Thus there is a growing group of transnational entrepreneurs who commute 
intensively in an attempt to profit from the economic opportunities which present themselves in 
several countries at the same time. They belong both to their region of origin and to their 
reception region36. 
  
30 Hernandez-Coss et al. 2006.
31 89% of the repatriates lived for more than 5 years in Ivory Coast, and 65% for longer than 10 years (CONAPO 
2006).
32 Beauchemin e.a. 2005.
33 Zourkaléini 2005.
34 Jackson et al. 2004.
35 Portes 1996
36 see Maas 2005, for the Philippines.
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4. Viewpoints in the areas of origin: common issues
In analysing the characteristics of migration in the various countries in sub-Saharan Africa, we 
found a number of common features that can be summarised under the following headings:
Migration is not new: traditional types of population mobility 
In most sub-Saharan countries the population has always been one of the most mobile in the 
world. There are many examples of nomadism, and livelihood systems are based on people’s 
ability to move in response to seasonal variation and variability of natural resources. International 
borders imposed during colonial times were often not in line with the natural conditions, nor did 
they coincide with the territorial claims of different ethnic groups. International migration is 
therefore man-made, i.e., a reflection of the introduction of artificial boundaries. Some of the 
international migration forms part of indigenous patterns of mobility (i.e., traditional, seasonal 
movements within one and the same eco-region). (see de Haas for Nigeria; Rutten for Kenya; and 
Broekhuis for Senegal and Burkina).
Migration patterns reflect colonial patterns of forced labour
During the colonial period, large flows of Europeans moved in the direction of the Asia, Latin 
America and Africa and introduced systems of forced labour in order to have sufficient labour in 
the colonial economy (mines and agricultural estates). In addition to the deportation of slaves to 
of South America and the Caribbean37, there were important population movements to the mining 
areas and the coastal regions (plantations). In addition, taxes imposed by the French stimulated 
many Burkinabé to migrate to Ghana as a way of escaping from French colonial rule (Broekhuis 
2006). After independence, some of the colonial population left, to be partly replaced by the 
arrival of a new group of Europeans who moved voluntarily in search of new opportunities 
overseas. But the dominant migration routes remained the same, with mines and agricultural 
estates still being important destination areas for African migrants (colonial patterns of circular 
migration in the direction of the coastal areas). In Nigeria, the dominant movement of internal 
migration is still towards the densely populated coastal areas, although Abuja in the centre and 
Kano in the north are also major destinations for internal migrants (de Haas 2006).
Rapid urbanisation and a brain drain
In the 1950s and ’60s most countries had to cope with rapid urbanisation (internal migration) and 
where Africans decided to leave (international migration) it was often the elite who left. In 
countries such as Nigeria, there was a large outflow of the elite to Europe and the US (as a 
response to political change, conflicts and disparities in economic opportunity), which resulted in 
a rapid brain drain.
Anti-migration policies
Where national governments made an attempt to reduce urbanisation or to counter the negative 
effects of mass migration (brain drain) they usually did so by introducing exit visas (e.g., in 
Rwanda, Mozambique, Tanzania, as well as Burkina Faso [Broekhuis 2006:8]). In Rwanda, but 
also elsewhere, people were obliged to pay guarantees (deposits in bank accounts) and family 
members had to sign before people were allowed to leave the country. Governments did their best 
  
37 This human trafficking laid the basis for the creation of one of the earliest African diasporas (Mafukidze 
2006:109).
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to fix people in the countryside, often as part of socialist policies (Tanzania, Mozambique; for the 
latter, see Raimundo 2006). 
Alternations between immigration (economic growth) and expulsions (crisis)
In many cases, countries have experienced reversal of migration, in response to economic booms 
or stagnation. Countries like Nigeria and Ivory Coast, as well as South Africa, Kenya and Ghana 
attracted migrant labour during times of rapid economic growth, followed by crisis and economic 
decline, which often went hand in hand with the expulsion of foreign populations. In Nigeria, 
after a period of rapid growth between 1973 and 1981, economic decline led the government to 
expel large numbers of West African migrants in 1983 and 1985, including one million 
Ghanaians (de Haas 2006). Other examples –often combined with political conflicts- include 
Ivory Coast and Ghana (expulsion of large numbers of Burkinabé) and Kenya (expulsion of 
Ugandans and other groups in 1984 and 1987) (Rutten 2006). Kenya and South Africa and also 
Botswana (Gwebu 2006) now have to cope with discrimination and xenophobia.
Root causes of migration
The history of migration cannot be seen in isolation from poverty and other push factors that are 
often described as root causes of international migration. Because of harsh environmental 
conditions (droughts, less fertile land) and a low technological level, the agricultural sector is 
unable to provide employment and income for the constantly increasing population numbers 
(Broekhuis 2006: 7, writing about Burkina Faso). Similar factors are mentioned for Central and 
East Africa: ecological degradation and disasters (droughts) and the lack of economic prospects 
and conflict are among the principal causes of migration (see Spaan and Moppes 2006; Rutten 
2006). 
Recruitment programmes, family reunion and asylum policies
In various countries (Nigeria, Ghana, but also South Africa) emphasis is given to the fact that 
international migration has started and recently intensified as a direct response to recruitment 
programmes. Universities and enterprises in the Gulf states and the Middle East, Canada and the 
US, and different EU countries play an active role in ‘cherry picking’. Current migration patterns 
cannot be understood without taking into account the history of guest worker programmes, 
consolidated by the subsequent process of family reunification. Later migration is also a 
reflection of northern asylum policies. It is stressed that, for a long time, core countries have 
played an active role in shaping migration flows. The introduction of restrictive policies occurred 
relatively recently.
Lack of comparable data  
Much emphasis is placed in many countries on the lack of data and deficient information about 
international migration. Within sub-Saharan Africa (but also elsewhere) the comparison of 
statistics is very complicated. A first factor which should be taken into account when trying to 
make an assessment of the importance of international migration is that of differences in 
population size. In a country like Nigeria, with its large population, international outmigration is 
relatively modest in comparison with massive internal migration (large numbers of IDPs), but it 
is still considered one of the most important sending countries, with large numbers of Nigerians 
concentrating in the US or UK. 
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According to the statistics, there is a clear distinction between internal and international 
migration, but this is not necessarily a different experience. In many cases, the impact of internal 
migration (short distance) is not necessarily less than long distance, international border 
crossings. In the case of Nigeria, for example, taking into account the huge ethnic, linguistic and 
religious variety, as well as the fact that non-indigenous inhabitants of states face considerable 
legal institutional discrimination, the characteristics and personal impacts of inter-state migration 
may resemble those of international moves, especially within Africa. It is important to observe 
that differentials in development within Nigeria are at least as important, if not greater, than 
between West African countries. The difference between international and internal migrants is 
not always clear, and in many cases conflicts also occur in relation to internal, short-distance 
migration. 
Definitional problems
Another distinction made in statistics, but which is not always visible in reality is that between 
labour migrants, IDPs and refugees. Different groups live in different situations. Refugees who 
went to Burkina Faso (a restricted group of 1,200 people from Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Eritrea, 
Somalia and Chad) are allowed to live dispersed in the cities and are not concentrated into camps 
(Broekhuis 2006). This is the opposite to the situation in Kenya, where people live in camps and 
are not allowed to work. A Somali, who entered Kenya as a refugee, will lose this special status 
as soon as he leaves the refugee camp. Refugees become illegal aliens as soon as they leave the 
refugee camp (Rutten 2006). In addition, refugees are sometimes better off than native groups 
living in the same area: In Kenya, the Turkana living near a refugee camp receive less support 
and experience more insecurity than the foreign groups who are supported by UNCHR (Rutten 
200638). Depending upon the definition (migrant, refugee, IDP) or nationality, people have 
varying chances of receiving support by international organisations, but also for buying land or 
getting a job in government (not possible for aliens in Ivory Coast). 
The Burkinabé, who were forced to return to their country of origin after expulsion from Ivory Coast, were never 
granted the legal status of refugees. After their arrival in Burkina Faso, most of them were seen as return migrants 
(i.e., they did not get the status of refugees). At the same time, however, their children (who were born in Ivory Coast 
and returned with their parents) were registered as immigrants (they had never been able to acquire Ivorian 
nationality. While they are not eligible for official government jobs or able to own land in Ivory Coast, they are also 
not accepted as full citizens in Burkina Faso.
Conflicting images and tensions
In addition to these definitional problems, there are complications related to the image of 
migrants, and how people look at each other from different sides. 
In host countries, migrants are often seen as strangers who are different from local people, who 
have different habits and attitudes and who came to profit from better living conditions in the 
host country. In their country of origin they are seen as money makers, a positive image based on 
the remittances brought or sent home through informal or formal channels. In addition it is 
expected that migrants will acquire specific knowledge during their sojourn abroad which can be 
used in their own interest after their return or applied in the interest of their country of origin. If 
these conditions are not fulfilled, the image of migrants is not so positive (Broekhuis 2006) and 
there are increasing tensions between the migrant population and the non-migrants. In Burkina 
Faso there is an increasing competition between the tengas (native people) and the diaspos
  
38 see also Horst 2006, for the situation of Somali refugees.
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(children of emigrated Burkinabé who have returned from Ivory Coast and have decided to study 
in Burkina because of the lower costs and the hope of better job opportunities). 
Remittance corridors and geographical restrictions
In the case of international migration, it is acknowledged that the impact of remittances is 
spatially limited, because most migrants originate from particular areas and concentrate in a 
limited number of destination areas. This means that migration not only generates patterns of 
dependency, but also creates patterns of spatial and social inequality.
In Nigeria, for example, most of the migrants who have moved to the EU and US originate from 
the southern provinces. The Ibo from the southeast and the Yoruba from the southwest, and, to a 
lesser extent the Edo and the Ogoni ethnic groups constitute the majority of Nigerian migrants in 
the UK39. On the other side (the destination areas), too, the areas involved in international 
migration are rather limited. 50% of all the Nigerians - and also Kenyans - who migrated to the 
US are to be found in Washington, with the rest distributed between Texas, California, Georgia 
and North Carolina (Rutten 2006). This means that international migration in reality involves 
only a limited number of areas; the majority of the population will not be able to benefit from 
migration.
New labour opportunities thanks to the ageing of the population in Europe 
International migration is viewed in nearly all countries as something necessary and positive; as 
long as there are insufficient work opportunities in the migrants’ own country, partly as a result 
of demographic growth, international migration is a logical response and a human right as long as 
no better alternatives exist. It is expected that Europe will need extra labour in the years to come 
as a result of the ageing of the population and that Europe, like the US and Canada, will turn to a 
more selective migration policy40. Europe’s need creates opportunities for labour migration, in 
particular, for doctors, nurses and technical experts41 (Broekhuis 2006:5). At the same time, little 
information is available about Europe’s future labour needs.
The criminalisation of migrants
In most sub-Saharan countries illegal or clandestine migration42 and human trafficking are 
regarded as undesirable, and many countries are prepared to cooperate in combating them. 
Besides programmes aimed at combating trafficking in women and children, the combating of 
illegality, including the forging of documents is high on the agenda. 
At the same time, however, it is experienced as a great problem that migrants (including 
illegal immigrants and victims of human trafficking) are being increasingly criminalised. People 
are wrongly treated as criminals. In most countries there is understanding for European attempts 
to counteract unauthorised immigration. The more stringent admittance of migrants is usually not 
a point of general discussion, nor is it put forward as blameworthy policy, but it does call for a 
larger allocation of visas. A point of concern, however, is the treatment of migrants in Europe. 
There was a call from many sides for a more respectful treatment of migrants and for the 
  
39Hernandez-Coss et al. 2006.
40 Commission European Communities 2003.
41 Introductory speech of Minister for Youth and Employment (Burkina Faso).
42 It is interesting to note that, for a long period of time in Burkina Faso in the recent past, terms like illegal or 
clandestine migration were not used. It was more common to refer to migration spontane or migration sauvage 
(Broekhuis Burkina: 2006: 10-16). 
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avoidance of indignity. Some blame was expressed about the failure by most of the northern 
countries to ratify the ILO Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and their Family Members (Broekhuis 2006:5). There is criticism in many countries of the 
present deportation policy and the way in which victims are sent back to the country of origin 
together with the human traffickers in the same aircraft (Broekhuis 2006, de Haas 2006).
5. Issues on the policy agenda: a country overview
The crucial objective of our research was to analyse viewpoint and policy initiatives in the 
countries of origin. What are the issues that are currently on the migration agenda in the different 
countries, and how is this linked to the performance of international migration? In the survey that 
follows we analyse the present situation in different countries, beginning with the analysis of 
agendas in countries with predominantly south-south migration (Rwanda, Burkina Faso), then 
countries with predominantly South-North migration (Senegal), ending with the countries 
classified as diasporic states (Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya, including China, India, the Philippines 
etc.). It is interesting to note that there is a kind of continuum in the migration agendas of the 
different countries. 
Rwanda 
In Rwanda, after years of conflict, the population has become dispersed over a large number of 
neighbouring countries and countries in the EU, where migrants have asked for asylum. The 
migration agenda is determined mainly by three issues (Muhoza and Rutayisire 2006).
- How can we ensure that people are prepared to return to their country of origin (a considerable 
part of the population still lives abroad and has insufficient trust to return)?
- How to ensure that the diaspora is prepared to invest in Rwanda?
- How do we manage to attract the necessary expertise from abroad? Because of the lack of 
skilled labour in Rwanda teachers and medical personnel are attracted mainly from the 
neighbouring countries (including Kenya).
Burkina Faso
In past years large groups emigrated from Burkina Faso to Ivory Coast to work in the plantation 
economy there. There has recently been a massive deportation. The migrant population has 
returned en masse, together with their children who were born in Ivory Coast. The following 
subjects are currently high on the agenda (Broekhuis 2006):
-How do we deal with problems of poverty- the rural exodus and urbanisation (Broekhuis, 
Burkina) and how to provide sufficient employment for young people?
-How to guarantee the protection of migrant rights (how to ensure that the Burkinabé in Ivory 
Coast are better treated)? 
- How to deal with the sudden arrival of return migrants and how to incorporate them without 
generating conflicts? Burkinabé who were massively deported from Ivory Coast no longer fit 
within the traditional structures. How to take care of integration of ex-migrants in local 
communities/ how to prevent land conflicts/ how to promote sustainable development of natural 
resources? How to prevent migrants moving from insecurity to poverty?. 
-Special attention is paid in this connection to the problems of the second and third generation: 
Burkinabé children do not have Ivorian nationality (they are second class citizens in Ivory Coast), 
but are regarded in Burkina Faso as immigrants. How to deal with this second generation?
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-How do we deal with increasing tensions between the tengas and diaspos (children of Burkinabé 
who have emigrated to Ivory Coast who come to study in Burkina because it is cheaper and 
because they are not eligible for government jobs in Ivory Coast)?
-How to ensure that the remittances which are sent back from Ivory Coast can be received in the 
countryside (there are no banks); are used for productive purposes (there are few investment 
opportunities). Remittances are largely used to repay the costs of migration (including 
maintaining social obligations).
-How to ensure that the volume of remittances increases and stabilises? At present remittances 
are relatively small: they decreased from 4.5% (1994) to 1.7% of DGP (2006). Remittances are 
currently an unstable source of income, both at the level of the state and at the individual 
household level. 
-How to ensure that the image of Burkina is improved so that people want to invest there (in the 
eyes of its emigrants Burkina Faso is old-fashioned, hot and dry)/ how can remittances be used 
for employment generation?
-How can migrant organisations be persuaded to become more actively involved in national or 
local development?
Migrant organisations in Burkina Faso expressed the following list of wishes (Broekuis 2006: 10):
- assistance from embassies and consulates in the case of emergencies and expulsions;
- regulations for social security through bilateral agreements;
- information for potential migrants about rights and obligations in the receiving country;
- information about investment opportunities in Burkina Faso, other possibilities than housing projects; easy 
procedures for buying land.
- fulfilment of international treaties by Burkina Faso (criticism of other countries is impossible if one’s own 
country sets a bad example);
- bilateral agreements on migration quotas (Italy mentioned as an example);
- Embassies should collect information about compatriots present in the country43;
- Right to vote for migrants; this would ensure the involvement of migrants in developments in their home 
country;
- Improvement of money transfer arrangements. There was a lot of criticism of the lack of SONAPOST 
services and the high costs of transfer by banks. Suggestion: development of internet banking!
- Easy procedures for obtaining official documents, including those for the children of Burkinabé abroad.
Senegal
Senegal was for a long time an immigration country (mainly for the neighbouring countries), but 
now there is an important flow of emigrants to the EU. This makes Senegal an example of a 
country that has to deal both with immigration and emigration, while it acts also as a transition 
zone. The inflow of remittances is seen as an important part of a strategy for national 
development. The migration agenda is dominated by very different agenda items (Broekhuis and 
Ndione, 2006):
-How can more employment be created for the youth?
-How can we benefit more from our population overseas (in France and other EU countries) and 
how do we manage to increase the volume of remittances (reduction of transition costs). 
Comment gagner la confiance des emigrants?
-How can we guard our borders better and control the inflow of migrants from the neighbouring 
countries. How to combat the forging of identity papers? 
  
43Counter-argument: a limited number of migrants register at embassies.
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-How to deal with the problem of undocumented migrants who originate from neighbouring 
countries and (after deportation) claim to be Senegalese in the EU? 
-How to negotiate with Spain and France on the question of readmission and how to best profit 
from migrant quotas?
-How can we best profit from the funds which are available for migration development (e.g. 
TOKTEN and MIDA).
Au Senegal, le gouvernement a annoncé une tolérance zéro en matiére d’émigration clandestine! Cependant la 
politique de migration officielle exprime dans la presse ou sur les conférences récentes est de fixer la population 
sénégalaise avec des programmes de développement qui favorisent l’épanouissement individuel et collectif ainsi 
l’espoir de prospérité économique. (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006: 9). On veut eviter le depart des jeunes!
Pour beaucoup de jeunes africains subsahariens, l’enfer est chez soi et le paradis ailleurs. Le message fort envoyé 
aux gouvernements des pays d’origine et d’accueil est qu’ils se lanceront toujours désespérément la quête de 
nouvelles stratégies de contournement des politiques migratoires et de franchissement des frontières. (Broekhuis and 
Ndione, 2006: 12).
Nigeria
Nigeria has played an important role for a long time as an immigration country, but at the same 
time a large part of the population has become dispersed over a large number of countries. It 
possesses a considerable diaspora, with concentrations in the UK and the US. Within Nigeria the 
migrants and remittances play only a relatively small role. The GNP and the economy are largely 
determined by oil, and the migrant population forms a very small proportion of the total 
population. Nigeria is characterised by a high level of ethnic heterogeneity. A large part of the 
population is classified as internally displaced (IDPs) and there is a measure of discrimination 
and xenophobia. To the extent that attention is paid to migration in Nigeria, it is mainly the 
following topics that are of interest (de Haas 2006):
-How can we act against trafficking in women and children/combating human trafficking in 
general, supported by international organisations (OIM). This point has been placed on the 
agenda partly because Nigeria attaches importance to the improvement of Nigeria’s in the world 
(Nigeria is very much associated with criminal activities (such as trade in cocaine, financial 
fraud, money laundering, human trafficking etc.).
-How to improve the image of migration/ end the criminalisation of migrants. All undocumented 
migrants are categorised as illegals and the traffickers are deported together with the victims (see 
also above). How to improve the rights of migrants in the case of repatriation; repatriation often 
has the characteristics of deportation (with undocumented migrants are treated as criminals and as 
not leaving voluntarily). In many cases the traffickers are repatriated on the same charter flight as 
their victims. Although the readmission agreements with European Countries state that 
undocumented migrants should be returned on a voluntary basis, many repatriations have the 
character of deportations, with undocumented migrants being treated as criminals. 
Undocumented migrants who are apprehended in Europe are imprisoned in detention centres 
before being deported and aircraft are full of police and security people (de Haas 2006: 9-10). 
How to solve the problem of fake identity papers (see also Kenya)?
- How to deal with foreign groups, including refugees and IDPs? In a country like Nigeria, there 
are many foreign groups: from Ghana and Mali, Togo and Benin and Niger (according to recent 
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UN estimates, over 971,000 immigrants live in Nigeria44), and there are also large numbers of 
Internally displaced people. How do we deal with problems related to xenophobia (which also 
affects migrants from neighbouring states)?
- How can we launch the presidential dialogue with Nigerians abroad; and restore trust among the 
Nigerian diaspora? How do we deal with the high insecurity and crime rates, high level of 
corruption, and lack of economic reform? How can we make it more attractive for the diaspora to 
invest their money in Nigeria?
- How can we create more legitimate opportunities for migration? How can we better prepare for 
exploiting global employment opportunities (brain circulation)? 
The issue of trafficking of female Nigerian sex workers is currently an important issue in Nigeria: it is estimated that 
there are 10,000 Nigerian prostitutes, not only in Italy, but also in the Netherlands and Spain. According to a recent 
study, traffickers, especially in Kano state, have successfully exploited the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to traffic 
children, men and women for different exploitative purposes, e.g. prostitution, begging and all forms of domestic 
work (cf. Ehindero et al. 2006). There is some pressure from the US and from donors to combat trafficking (de Haas 
2006). Trafficking is also seen as harmful to Nigeria’s image abroad (de Haas 2006:10).
The National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and other Related Matters (NAPTIP), works in 
collaboration with UNICEF and OIM. There is also an anti-trafficking programme for West Africa (PATWA) (de 
Haas 2006: 11).
Kenya
Like Nigeria, an important part of the population has emigrated from Kenya over a longer period 
and become dispersed over various countries of the world. This gives Kenya the characteristics of 
a diasporic state. While the elite have emigrated (e.g. to the US), Kenya - as a safe haven – has 
played a role as a reception country for the neighbouring countries. Kenya acts as a concentration 
country for the reception of refugees. Large groups of Somalis currently find themselves in 
refugee camps, are not entitled to work or to settle freely. 
The migration agenda is determined by the following subjects (Rutten 2006):
- How do we treat refugees (and how do we prevent the Somalis taking our jobs?). How do we 
deal with them in relation to marginal national groups (such as the Turkana)? Refugees are 
considered to be relatively better off: a range of services and benefits are available from NGOs 
and UN agencies (provisions like water, education and medical attention receive priority in the 
camps). As they are not allowed to own cattle or farm, they are given regular food hand outs45. 
- How can immigration controls and visa policies be operated to limit illegal immigration (the 
problems here include: false documents supporting visa applications; false bank statements, 
letters of reference etc). How do we deal with the Asians who use Kenya as a transition zone? 
How to close the borders to terrorists (demanded by the US in reaction to the attack on the US 
embassy). It was concluded in the 2005 mid-term strategy report that Kenya had suffered in the 
recent past from international terrorism whose roots had to do with the movement of people 
across boundaries. The revelations in some of the cases of terrorism indicate that Kenya’s 
immigration services may not have the capacity to deal with the sophistication that goes with 
  
44 UN General Assembly 2006
45 Deborah Elijah Agok, a Sudanese women, says the Turkana feel antagonistic because of their own food shortage. 
They don’t like us because we get rations, and they are very hungry she says. They are angry because their land is 
dry. In the neighbourhood of the camps, there are sometimes conflicts that give rise to further internal displacement 
(Rutten 2006: 11-12).
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international travel today (Rutten 2006:6). It was noted that there was a need to streamline 
immigration screening procedures for the entry of refugees and to eliminate all discriminatory 
screening practices (demanded by NEPAD). In Kenya aliens are obliged to register (Rutten 
2006:15).
-  How do we act against human trafficking and enslavement?
In Kenya, trafficking is considered an important issue: Kenya is a source, transit, and destination country for men, 
women, and children trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation. Kenyan children are trafficked within the 
country for domestic servitude, street vending, agricultural labour, and sexual exploitation, including the coastal sex 
tourism industry. Kenyan men, women, and girls are trafficked to the Middle East, other African nations, Western 
Europe, and North America for domestic servitude, enslavement in massage parlours and brothels, and manual 
labour. Chinese women trafficked for sexual exploitation reportedly pass through Nairobi, and Bangladeshis may 
pass through Kenya for forced labour in other countries. Burundian and Rwandan nationals engaged in coastal sex 
tourism may have been trafficked for this purpose. Lastly, Asian nationals, principally Indians, Bangladeshi and 
Nepalese, are trafficked into Kenya and coerced into bonded labour in the construction and garment industries 
(Trafficking in Persons Report 2004), in Rutten 2006:3; (There has been a human trafficking unit In Kenya since 
2004). 
- How can the diaspora be deployed strategically in national development? After President Kibaki 
won the 2002 election he called upon Kenyans to return home. This was mainly addressed to 
those intellectuals who had opted to go abroad for political reasons during the rule of President 
Moi. At the same time, the new government announced its intention to create 500,000 jobs 
annually. However, this ambition was not met. Estimates are that only some 50,000 jobs were 
created in the first six months after it came into power. Kenya was apparently not yet in a 
position to welcome home its community abroad. Moreover, there was a growing realisation that 
the Kenyan diaspora was becoming a significant player in Kenya’s economic development 
through the remittances sent home from abroad (Rutten 2006:20). 
- How can we ensure that highly qualified labour is strategically deployed. In Kenya there is a 
special office with the task of promoting the strategic deployment of expertise overseas.
Examples of issues in other countries
(China, Leung 2006; India, Rhaguram 2006; the Philippines, Baggio 2006; Ghana, Manuh 2006; 
and Mexico, Marchand 2006):
- How do we increase the flow of remittances/ and ensure that the money is used for social and/or 
productive projects in the collective sector (Tres por Uno; Mexico)? 
- How to reduce the dependency of a country on remittances (Cape Verde) and how to
reduce/compensate the negative effects of the brain drain (Ghana)?
- How to maintain the contacts with the diaspora in the longer term, i.e. how to ensure that 
second and third generations also continue to be involved (China, India, Korea)?
- How do we improve the living conditions of the migrants overseas; How to prevent abuses?/ 
how to prepare the migrants better for living abroad (Philippines, Mexico)?
- How do we make the best use of diaspora organisations and migrant organisations for the 
development of the country of origin without this leading to fragmentation/ proliferation (the 
Philippines has over a thousand organisations worldwide)?
- How to ensure that the diaspora is prepared to invest in the mother country (China, India, 
Korea)? how do we ensure an attractive investment climate?
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6. A summary of concrete policy initiatives
Reviewing migration as a policy issue, it becomes clear that, since colonial times, the stimulation 
and/or controlling of migration has been an important strategy for encouraging economic growth 
(through, for example, systems of forced labour). Since independence, African states have tried to 
respond to the brain drain and urbanisation by issuing exit visas and obliging people to remain in 
the countryside (Mozambique, Rwanda, etc.). In some countries, it is thus only recently that 
people have been free to move and this should be taken into account when trying to assess 
international migration. Where the volume of international migration has increased, this is the 
result partly of time-space compression and the technological revolution, and partly of the neo-
liberal reforms and processes of regional integration, which have stimulated the free movement 
of capital and goods. Neo-liberal policies have also resulted in the collapse of local economies 
which, together with ecological problems, have reduced the opportunities for local development.
In spite of the growing concern of governments with migration issues, and the large range 
of topics that are currently on the policy agenda, most of the sending countries have no consistent 
migration policy. In most instances there is a laisser faire approach, with no obstacles being 
thrown up in a systematic manner to limit international migration or measures being taken to 
strengthen migration. While there have been great efforts at the regional level in recent years to 
secure the right of free movement, residence and establishment (in Africa, ECOWAS, UEMOA, 
AU; in Latin America, MERCOSUR, ALCA etc.), the implementation has been subject to many 
restrictions: most conventions, treaties and agreements have proved to be dead letters without 
ratification by national parliaments or their translation into national laws (Broekhuis 2006)46. In 
sub-Saharan Africa the efforts to achieve the free movement of persons has led in a certain sense 
to reduced possibilities for controlling migration, and human traffickers have been able to profit 
from this. 
In recent years a great many arrangements have been made by northern countries (EU) 
with individual countries, for example, between Nigeria with Italy; as well as between South 
Africa and Namibia, Botswana, and Tanzania and DR Congo etc.; and Senegal with France and 
Spain (Rutten 2005). There is a growing number of bilateral arrangements between countries to 
control migration, in some cases, combined with co-development programmes. At the same time, 
there has been some intensification of recruitment, not only from the US/ Canada/ the EU or the 
Gulf States, but also within sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya, high school and elementary school 
teachers were recruited throughout the 1990s in such places as the Seychelles, Rwanda, Burundi 
and Congo (Rutten 2006: 19). Today, recruitment is strong, especially in South Africa. In the 
negotiations between the sending and receiving countries conditions are often imposed relating to 
border controls, which can have a harmful effect on the relations between neighbouring countries. 
As far as the link between international migration and combating poverty is concerned, 
international migration is referred to only to a very limited extent at the level of the individual 
countries in the context of PRSPs (van der Veen 2006). There is generally no systematic policy. 
Migration is either referred to as a negative force (e.g. Nigeria) or related to positive 
developments, but there is no systematic approach and international migration has not so far been 
cited as a structural element for combating poverty. Migration is still primarily seen as a 
development failure rather than a constituent part of broader social and economic transformation 
processes (de Haas 2006: 12-13). The boxes below show how migration is regarded in the 
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various countries and the sub-themes to which it is related (see also van der Veen 2006, and 
Black 2004).
Nigeria
Nigeria’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), better known in Nigeria as NEEDS (see NNPC 2004), mentions 
internal migration, which is generally seen as a force disrupting social cohesion in village societies and causing 
urban unemployment. Migration is strongly and one-sidedly associated with trafficking, forced child labour and 
prostitution. In addition, Nigeria’s PRSP perceives internal migration as a force which potentially contributes to 
urban unemployment and urban pollution and waste management problems (NNPC 2004:12 + xix). Migration of the 
educated workforce to urban areas would also cause the ageing and deepen the poverty of rural populations (NNPC
2004:32), and is indirectly blamed for the decrease in the level of security through social dislocation caused by 
massive rural-urban migration, and the breakdown of societal values, leading to fraud and community unrest (NNPC 
2004:95). The perceived solution to these problems is to develop rural areas to stem rural-urban migration through 
rural development schemes (NNPC 2004:70). The PRSP proposes implementing an integrated rural development 
programme to stem the flow of migration from rural to urban areas (NNPC 2004: ix). Nigeria’s PRSP warns that if 
rural development strategies fail and internal migration continues, the rate of urban unemployment could become 
unmanageable. The implications for poverty and crime, conflict, and the maintenance of democracy are grave 
(NNPC 2004: 43) (de Haas 2006:12-13).
Nigeria’s PRSP draws a clear link between democratisation and economic growth, on the one hand, and the role of 
emigrants and donors to national economic development on the other. Some momentum for change has been 
building since the transition to democracy in 1999. Increasing numbers of Nigerians in the diaspora are willing to 
return and contribute to the economy, and many of the donor agencies that boycotted Nigeria during the military era 
have returned (NNPC 2004: 13). The PRSP also aims to continue to actively strengthen links with Nigerians and 
other Africans in the diaspora, to deepen technical and business ties with the rest of the world, and improve export 
market penetration, especially in textiles, food and cultural artefacts (NNPC 2004: 83); de Haas 2006: 15.
Burkina Faso
Burkina does not pursue a real migration policy. Migration enables households to supplement their income, to 
diminish income falls and spread risks; in more favourable cases savings as result of migration can be used for 
investments in economic activities. Increase of South-North migration is expected as result of globalisation processes 
and is expected to contribute to the wealth of households involved and the country as a whole. The costs for 
individual migrants and their families of this high migration prevalence in terms of suffering and risks and disruption 
of family life are occasionally mentioned. During the symposium some participants put forward the possible effects 
of migration on social cohesion. But this aspect did not consider families and local societies which had to deal with 
the absence of a large part of their members, but at the integration of rural internal migrants and repatriates in host 
communities and their access to natural resources as threats of existing social cohesion. (Broekhuis, Burkina).
Senegal
Pour mieux grer et rentabiliser les efforts des sénégalais vivant à l’étranger dans sa contribution au développement 
du pays, les pouvoirs publics ont mis en place diverses institutions successives dans le temps et développé plusieurs 
stratégies politiques liées au return et la réinsertion des migrs.: de promotion et de protection des Sénégalais de 
l’extérieur; (ministère des sénégalais de l’extérieur). (Broekhuis and Ndione 2006)
Kenya
The PRSP mentions the need to increase surveillance and strengthen immigration points at the border points of entry 
in order to curb the large influx of refugees and the proliferation of illegal firearms. (Rutten 2006:2)
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Summarising the types of programmes that are currently under way, we can say that they are 
usually a combination of the following measures. (Some of the measures are supported by Dutch 
development cooperation (indicated in the listing by **).
Policy priorities in the sending countries (also prioritised on the migration and development 
agenda of receiving countries/ donor agencies)
- Increasing the flow of remittances/ ensuring a more productive investment of the money 
through forms of co-financing (co-development in West Africa/ Tres por Uno in Mexico).
- **Measures aimed at encouraging brain gain and limiting brain drain; encouragement of 
return often linked to northern programmes (MIDA, TOKTEN; in Senegal, Ghana, and 
also Burkina Faso). While in many sending countries there is an interest in how an 
impulse can be given to brain gain (without the expectation of return), many donors and 
receiving countries place the emphasis mainly on return and/or limiting the brain drain. 
Donors try through programmes such as MIDA and TOKTEN to create possibilities for 
bringing expertise back to the region of origin, although the numbers are very modest and 
the success is limited (and the number of beneficiaries is not in proportion to the total 
number of migrants and/or expatriates.
France launched the idea of co-development in the 80s/early 90s. This idea was adopted as a new development 
strategy by European leaders at their summit meeting in Tampere (Finland) in 1999. Follow-ups to this idea were 
given in Cotonou 2000, the Paris Seminar in 2000 and at the Dakar Conference in 2000. The MIDA project 
(Migrations pour le développement en Afrique) was launched in 2001 in Libreville (Gabon) by 20 African countries. 
Key elements of this project are: involvement of private and public sectors, initiatives and financing by African 
countries themselves with the assistance of OIM; encouragement and facilitation of the return of qualified nationals. 
Le TOKTEN est un autre projet de mobilisation de l’expertise de l’extérieur en vue de leur transfert dans le pays 
d’origine, par le biais de missions d’intervention de courte dure. Sur la base des demandes exprimées par rapport aux 
besoins des structures publiques et privées au Sénégal, le projet identifie les cadres qualifiés répondant aux profils de 
ces besoins et organise leurs voyages. Contrairement au projet Initiatives de codéveloppement qui se limite en 
France, le TOKTEN cible tous les pays d’accueil des Sénégalais, notamment les pays développés du Nord.
- ** Capacity strengthening/ improvement of border controls, intended to limit immigration 
from neighbouring countries. Investments are made within the framework of this policy 
and with financing from northern countries in the training of customs officials and 
equipment to sharpen border controls. This is employed in Kenya in order to keep a better 
check on internal migration (e.g. by Asians) and to keep out undesirable aliens. In sub-
Saharan Africa, however, the borders are highly porous; migrants respond to strengthened 
border controls by taking alternative routes (at a higher cost and risk) they linger for a 
longer time in transition zones. This approach generally does not lead to a reduction in the 
number of illegal immigrants, partly because it does not solve the problem of overstaying 
(people enter legally on a tourist or student visa, and stay longer than permitted). As soon 
as the stamp expires the holder becomes illegal and often there are no possibilities of 
leaving the country legally. 
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- ** Combating human trafficking (mainly of women and children, partly linked to the 
problem of forced labour). Many anti-trafficking policies are financed and carried out in 
collaboration with donors/ receiving countries (including the ILO). Different emphases 
are placed by the sending and receiving countries. The sending countries are critical of the 
receiving countries because they find that illegal migrants are not treated with respect. 
Most Nigerian stakeholders, in particular, those in non-governmental positions criticise 
the anti-trafficking policies of the European states, because they do not differentiate 
between traffickers and their victims, who are instead collectively labelled as illegals and 
subsequently expelled. They stress that serious anti-trafficking policies should address 
trafficked men and women as victims and protect their rights. A blanket repressive 
approach will work counterproductively, because it increases the strong reciprocal 
relationship between traffickers and their victims, who have career perspectives once they 
have paid off their debts and so have some prospect of improving their livelihoods in the 
longer term.
Nigeria:
According to the ILO, there are at least 660,000 forced labourers in sub-Saharan Africa, of whom 130,000 are 
victims of trafficking. However, the study revealed that 80 percent of forced labour in the region is for economic 
exploitation and 8 percent for commercial sexual exploitation (Ehindero et al. 2006); in the Haas 2006:5). 
The ILO office in Abuja is active in anti-trafficking, although with an emphasis on forced labour. Since 2004, ILO’s 
Special Action Programme to combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL) has implemented the Programme of Action to 
combat trafficking in West Africa (PATWA) by addressing the structural aspects of the demand and supply of 
trafficking in persons and the consequent forced labour in West Africa. The ILO collaborates with government 
(Ministry of Labour), unions (National Labour Union) and employers (National Labour Consultative). The IOM 
office in Abuja has conducted a project on Trafficking of Women and Children, but funding has now ended. The 
Nigerian president has appointed a Special Assistant to the President on Migration and Humanitarian Affairs. Her 
office has established a technical committee of government ministries and agencies47, which are currently discussing 
a coherent policy on migration and development. Members of civil society do not seem to be actively involved in the 
process. This process is facilitated by the Abuja office of IOM.
Kenya:
In Kenya there are district advisory children’s centres providing psychosocial services, medical and educational 
assistance and foster programmes for vulnerable, orphaned or abandoned children who are at risk from trafficking 
(Rutten 2006).
IOM provides training on the issue of human trafficking. In spite of this support, Kenyan migration officials have 
also pointed fingers at IOM, UNHCR and the US embassy for handing out visas for family reunion which, they 
claim, trigger human trafficking into Kenya. Migration in the name of family reunion can easily result in human 
trafficking. The US embassy, IOM and UNHCR issue visas even if these people have entered Kenya illegally. They 
do not allow the Kenyan authorities to prosecute them for being in Kenya illegally. IOM does not want us to 
prosecute because it is too costly for them, as people will have to stay longer when tickets might have been arranged 
for them. Thus IOM breaks the law on human trafficking and gets away with it. According to Ministry of Labour 
officials, the IOM programme to bring back Kenyans was a top-down programme brought to the East African 
community when Ugandans wanted to return home, but not so much the Kenyans and Tanzanians. IOM sets the 
  
47 The committee consists of the ministries of Finance, Education, Justice, Science and Technology, 
Intergovernmental Affairs and Youth Matters, Women’s Affairs, Health, Foreign Affairs. It also includes the 
following agencies: the central bank of Nigeria, National Commission for Refugees, NAPTIP, National Population 
Commission, Nigerian Labour Congress, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), National Planning 
Commission and the National Human Rights Commission. 
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agenda; we dance to their tune.
Policy priorities in the sending countries together with the diaspora (partly supported by 
receiving countries/ donor agencies). 
- The institution of a ministry of diaspora/ minister for diaspora (starting initiatives in 
Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Rwanda, Argentina); intensifying contacts with the population 
overseas. (comment gagner la confiance des emigrants?)
- Starting up cultural programmes etc.; spreading information; granting the franchise to the 
population in the diaspora. (is currently being discussed in several countries, including 
Kenya and Nigeria)
- Programmes aimed at improving the investment climate – aimed at attracting investment, 
e.g. by offering tax concessions etc. (examples: China, India and Korea; starting in 
Senegal). 
Policy priorities in de sending countries (not on the migration and development agenda of 
receiving countries/ donor agencies)
- Protection of the rights of migrants; the ILO Convention on Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and their Family Members (not ratified by most of the northern 
countries)
- How to create youth employment (e.g. in Senegal, Burkina)? Part of conventional 
development policies, but not on the migration and development agenda.
- Encouragement of immigration and return, e.g. in Rwanda. Le gouvernement Rwandaise 
encourage l’immigration des experts et des investisseurs étrangers. C’est dans le souci 
d’attirer ces investisseurs qu’un environnement favorable a été créé grâce a la mise en 
place d’un code particulier d’investissement. Forms part of the refugee agenda, but 
usually from the perspective of the reception region.
- Exporting the labour surplus /the development of remittance corridors. In different 
countries active attempts are made to facilitate emigration (providing services/institutional 
reforms) while an attempt is made to maximise the positive effects (e.g. the Philippines, 
Kenya, Ecuador); How can we best capitalise on future labour needs and how can 
migrants be better prepared for their task (improvement in quality)? In countries like 
Kenya there is an active policy aimed at exporting highly skilled labour (there is a special 
office for outplacement). In the Philippines, too, there is a tendency to target the training 
of professionals for work abroad. Not supported by receiving countries (not on their 
agenda; it is associated with threatened invasion)
- Reducing the dependency on remittances/ promoting a greater stability (Cape Verde, 
Kenya); not on the migration and development agenda of donors.
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Policy priorities in the receiving countries/ donors (not so much in line with priorities in 
sending countries).
- **Encouragement of circular migration (is presented as a win-win situation, because it 
makes migration possible without the threat of an invasion). From experience with 
migration to the Gulf States (strongly regulated migration with temporary labour 
contracts) it can be stated that there are nevertheless increasing tensions. There is a 
demand for this form of migration (as a means of supplementing income), but it offers no 
solution to the group which is mainly interested in career migration. The thought of return 
migration plays in the background of discussions on circular migration. This leads many 
sending countries to react with suspicion.
- Anti-migration campaigns/ information to make people aware of risks and dangers. 
Emphasis is placed in discussions in the receiving countries, and by donors, on the need 
to stop the brain drain (not often referred to in the sending countries) and the need to 
inform people about the risks of migration (in the sense of anti-emigration policy). In 
most of the sending countries these issues do not stand very high on the agenda. Where 
countries are confronted with a brain drain, they generally look for the solution in 
compensation programmes (people must be free to go, migration cannot be stopped). 
They are convinced that anti-migration propaganda does not work. They simply say: 
‘east, west, home is best. But this is the wrong message. You won’t stop people from 
going. You should instead inform people how to migrate legally, so as to create a 
balanced opinion. Migration is not really a bad thing’ (de Haas 2006: 12), although it is 
acknowledged that many people lack information about what to expect at the other end 
and are therefore vulnerable to exploitation.
- Policies for improving migration data. It is mainly from donor circles that resources are 
currently being provided for the provision of reliable information (migration statistics). 
Senegal is a pilot country in this respect. La conception de cet observatoire repose sur 
une valorisation scientifique des données administratives, collectes par des outils qui 
permettent un accés à l’information en temps réel. Depuis 2002, des systémes de collecte 
d’informations, crés partir de l’informatisation et de la mise en réseau des postes 
frontaliers, des juridictions et des agences consulaires du Sénégal sont mis en place par 
l’IRD et la direction de l’informatique de l’Université Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD) du 
Sénégal, en partenariat avec les Ministres de l’Intérieur, de la Justice et des Sénégalais 
de l’extérieur. Ces dispositifs sont appelés Observatoires sectoriels. L’ensemble s’appuie 
sur des compétences nationales et une coopération sud-nord (Broekhuis and Ndione
2006). At the same time it can be noted that insufficient attention is being paid to 
problems relating to the definition of migration (or more specifically the paradigms 
underlying such concepts as newcomer or alien, IDPs, refugee, circular migrant, and the 
consequences which a particular designation have for a person’s development chances. 
This less statistical and qualitative dimension remains underexposed, but is of great 
importance (more important than the precise quantification of the numbers of migrants).
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- ** involvement of migrants - diaspora organisations. There has recently been a growing 
interest from the sending region in making contact with the diaspora. Governments in 
reception zones and donors are trying to involve migrants actively in the formulation 
and/or implementation of policy in their region of origin. In the process they address the 
migrants and such diaspora organisations as exist in the reception region. By doing this, 
they are trying to benefit of the ‘overseas’ development potential (see section 7), but the 
problems should not be underestimated. Many migrant organisations are not expert in the 
field of development, are often not representative or politically coloured, and/or are 
sometimes seen from the perspective of the sending countries as defectors. Whether a 
contribution can be made to development through the support of diaspora organisations 
depends on the quality of the available expertise, and the extent to which the activities of 
the diaspora organisations worldwide can be harmonised with each other (in the case of 
the Philippines, for example, there are c. 1000 organisations [Baggio 2006]). In the worst 
case projects carried out by such organisations interfere with the mainstream policies 
carried out by the national government or local organisations.
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7. Intermezzo: African diaspora organisations in the Netherlands and development
During our research, while focusing on the perspective of the sending countries, we also 
interviewed migrant and diaspora organisations in the Netherlands (see van Naerssen et al 2006) 
in order to learn more about their views and perceptions, and to explore the opportunities for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to link with development-oriented MOs in the Netherlands in order to 
optimise the contribution of MOs to local, regional and national development in the countries of 
origin. Based on an earlier inventory of some 150 organisations (van Heelsum 2005; 2006) and 
additional research48, we made a selection of 67 African development MOs49, and interviewed 
representatives of the most important of them, focusing on Burkina Faso, Burundi, DR Congo, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Cape Verde Islands, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda (the analysis 
which follows is based on van Naerssen et al 2006; see Kusters et al 2006 for an overview of the 
selected organisations)50.
The African development MOs are diverse in character.  This applies to their size, their 
reach, the budget available, the types of projects and the political and economic context in which 
these projects have to be realised. The majority of the MOs are under ten years old and their 
members are mostly first generation immigrants. They are supported by a variety of Dutch 
organisations and institutions such as municipalities and Dutch CFAs. There is less involvement 
of private business (although there is some). MOs are more or less informed or otherwise find 
their way in the maze of funding organisations.
To the extent that MOs are actively involved in carrying out development activities in 
their countries of origin, projects are mostly local and small-scale. They are particularly 
represented in the sectors of education and health care. Nevertheless, the reach of small-scale 
projects can be large, as in micro-credit and awareness-raising programmes. The question of the 
sustainability of the projects is hard to answer, since most of them have been started only 
recently. Much depends on the local situation. Usually the relation with the local environment has 
been established at an informal level and good relations with family members and village chiefs 
are important. The reasons given for not engaging with local authorities at the formal level are 
corruption and inefficiency.
The MOs are of opinion that they have to improve their capacity to have a larger impact, 
but they also point out that much of their work is on voluntary basis. As their assets – or relative  
strengths - they mention strong motivation, knowledge of the culture in the country of origin, 
being well informed and speaking local languages. Nevertheless, some comments on this added 
value should be made. The real asset (or strength) of the MOs is that they possess social networks 
and knowledge at the local and regional levels, but not much at the national level. Social 
networks constitute useful social capital, but they might also constrain development, since 
linkages and obligations might lead to less objectivity and efficiency. Local knowledge and local 
relations are, of course, important, but it should also be acknowledged that they are no substitute 
for professional and technical skills.  Finally, people’s perception of emigrants in the home 
countries is not always necessarily positive. 
  
48 We compiled a list of all development MOs on the basis of information from the CFAs, internet and other sources 
of information, after which we checked whether these organisations still existed. It turned out that many MOs had 
ceased their activities or could not be reached. 
49 We limited our research to development MOs, i.e., the MOs with the clear objective of contributing to 
development in the countries of origin, as registered at the Chambers of Commerce.
50 See for further details working papers Migration and Development deries, reports 12 and 13.
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There are indications that there are differences in attitude between first generation and 
second generation migrants. With the latter, personal ties with people of the home country are 
less strong, which has both advantages and disadvantages. A disadvantage is that the second 
generation is usually less engaged in individual remittances, but the advantage is that they are 
inclined to social remittances (i.e., projects in the sphere of development). The second generation 
of MOs (a minority) seem to be more assertive and demanding a place in the development circuit. 
The success factors of African MOs are in principle the same as those of Dutch 
development-oriented organisations51. Apart from factors dependent on the specific regional or 
country contexts, the major factors that contribute to success are adequate anticipation of the 
demand, visible short-term results, ownership of the project by the target group, and 
professionalism of the project initiators. Project failures are mostly due to the lack of these 
success factors. The question is whether the strong assets of MOs, namely social contacts and 
local knowledge, constitute an added value compared with similar Dutch development NGOs. 
During the interviews references to this added value were made in the relation to the start of the 
projects. However, the degree to which local knowledge and social capital are decisive for the 
success of projects is not clear. 
African development MOs are well aware that ‘development’ is more than erecting a 
building or the donation of computers to students. The need to involve the community is a 
common wisdom and the complexity of ‘development’ is acknowledged. However, one has to 
start somewhere and the resources are limited. Education is often considered as a good starting 
point and there is usually a demand for it. With the support of Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), 
some MOs are involved in peace-building processes. However, this does not alter the fact that 
only a small number of MOs are explicitly involved in issues of good governance and 
democratisation (mostly in the form of information campaigns). Initiatives in this respect deserve 
strong support, the more so since these are issues that the MOs themselves consider as crucial for 
the development process and that are high on the agenda of Dutch development cooperation.
African MOs expect advice and financial support from the Dutch government and CFAs. 
There is a lack of understanding and appreciation of the country policy of Dutch development 
cooperation. Greater attention, more dialogue and a stronger involvement in Dutch development 
policy are desirable. At the same time, MOs want more understanding for the circumstance that 
they are often dependent on volunteers. 
The CFAs are important for the MOs. They encourage professionalism among the 
migrants and their support enables programmes and projects to be implemented on a larger scale. 
Nevertheless, there exists widespread and outspoken criticism of CFAs. It seems that mutual 
communication could be better.  The two representatives of two CFAs we interviewed recognise 
that there are tensions between CFAs and MOs as the following quotations of CFA 
representatives show: 
“A great problem of the CFAs and the migrant organisations is that both sides are 
arrogant. They both think that they know it all, instead of cooperating to share knowledge 
and join forces.” 
  
51 A development project is successful if it is sustainable, contributes to welfare improvement and empowerment of 
the target group. For large-scale programmes one can add the contribution to the realisation of the millennium 
development goals (MDGs). 
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“ Migrant organisations differ from each other, so we should not generalise. But what 
they say about our bureaucracy, our lack of decisiveness and the like, unfortunately, is 
true. Another difficulty is that our choice of a selective group of countries is difficult to 
explain.”
The MOs are usually embedded in a larger system in which internal and international emigration 
is a way for many Africans to improve their household or family livelihood. Among the African 
MOs in the Netherlands it appears that there is not much knowledge of migration policies in the 
country of origin, nor is there an inclination to influence or exert pressure on this policy (in the 
way that the Mexican and Philippine diasporas do).  One suggestion repeatedly made was that 
information should be provided to change the rather optimistic picture of migrants’ lives in 
Western countries. 
It is interesting that a change has occurred worldwide in the relationship between the 
governments of countries of origin and the MOs. Emigrants are no longer viewed as ‘defectors’ 
but as ‘countrymen abroad’, who can contribute to development. Ghana is a case in point. The 
country supports initiatives of knowledge transfer, including the MIDA (migration and 
development) programme of the ‘Ghana Health project’ coordinated by IOM-Netherlands.  
Another example is Cape Verde, which aims to encourage migrants’ investments and is 
considering cooperation with the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) in order to start 
return migration programme. Mention was made in our interviews of the representatives of 
Burkina Faso and Kenya in the Netherlands who have undertaken efforts to link with MOs.  In 
other European countries there are other, larger-scale, examples of cooperation between 
governments and their diasporas, such as the French co-développement programmes (since 1997) 
and the ACCORD initiatives in the UK.  
8. Final reflections, recommendations and suggestions for follow up 
This brings us to the final question: How can consistent migration policies contribute to 
combating poverty? At this moment, several ‘sending’ countries are looking at ‘migration and 
development’, but there are several reasons why international migration will not automatically 
result in poverty alleviation or sustainable development. 
Much will depend on the type of destination where migrants decide to go. People moving 
to the Gulf States will – in comparison with migrants who move to other destinations - have 
fewer possibilities for upward mobility than those who migrate to the US/Canada or the EU (and 
where conditions are better for establishment, family reunification, etc.).  Within the EU there are 
wide differences between countries in the possibilities for integration and becoming full citizens, 
which will determine to a large extent whether migrants will be able to benefit from migration or 
not. In comparison with other EU countries, the Netherlands is not viewed by many migrations as 
the most ideal destination, partly because of the language, but currently also because of the 
integration policies. Where people do arrive in the Netherlands, this is sometimes transit 
migration (there is currently an exodus of Somalis from the Netherlands to the UK).  
At the country level, the development potential of migration will greatly depend on the 
way countries are incorporated into the migration system. This has direct consequences for the 
possibility of being able to profit from migration. Diasporic states and countries with directed 
South-North migration generally find themselves in a relatively favourable position, while the 
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countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly faced with restrictions. In the case 
of south-south migration, migrants often travel without the required documentation, they are 
vulnerable to exploitation – do not receive protection; job opportunities – as well as salaries - are 
usually unfavourable in comparison with the northern destinations; the flow of remittances is 
small in comparison with the flow of money coming from the northern states, and much of the 
suffering remains invisible (northern countries have biased views, focusing in particular on the 
consequences of South-North migration).
To the extent that receiving states/ donors are currently implementing ‘migration and 
development’ policies, these are mainly aimed at controlling dominant patterns of south-north 
migration. The areas of origin are treated as ‘sending states’ without taking into account that 
many of these countries also play a role as immigration and/or transition areas. EU countries and 
a selected group of emigration countries are currently negotiating readmission and/or migration 
quotas (bilateral agreements), often without taking into consideration the negative consequences 
for intra-regional relations (i.e., restriction of migration from neighbouring states). 
Migration has clearly risen on the agenda in bilateral relations between Nigeria and the European states, who 
specifically seek Nigeria’s collaboration in the readmission of undocumented migrants or rejected asylum seekers of 
Nigerian citizenship . Some countries are hesitant to concede to demands from the Nigerian side for certain quotas of 
legal migrants in exchange for cooperation on re-admission, as Italy is doing (de Haas 2006: 9). 
In addition, there is another paradox: regional organisations (ECOWAS, AU etc.) aim at 
facilitating ‘free movement of persons’, but also acknowledge the need to control migration. 
Processes of regional integration seem to have given more space to human traffickers and have 
restricted the possibilities for states to control migration.
Restrictive policies – and more intensive border control in northern countries - have often 
been unable to solve the problem of illegal migration, but have – instead - resulted in a more 
complex situation. Migrants are forced to spend more money and time, take higher risks, and are 
more dependent on smugglers than before. The likelihood of international migration helping to 
combat poverty is less favourable than before. Migrants are increasingly attracted to criminal 
activities (to earn large amounts of money in a short time); the migration agenda has become 
mixed up with anti-terrorism; and human trafficking has intensified.
International migration might have helped groups of people to escape from poverty, but 
we should not forget that, in many cases, the impact tends to limited, even in the most favourable 
circumstances. Where migrants do manage to send remittances to their areas of origin, these 
flows are usually geographically concentrated (and benefit only small numbers of people). Flows 
of remittances help to create ‘islands of wealth’, but will in many cases not contribute to 
‘national’ development. Another problem is the variability of remittance flows and the lack of 
sustainability. Even if remittances are stable in the short run (first-generation migrants sending 
home significant amounts of money on a regular basis), this seems to be decline in the course of 
time (second or third generations often lose interest and feel less committed). Experience shows 
that migration streams from particular areas will usually not last longer than about 20 years, and 
that the intensity and direction of migration will very much depend on economic growth, which 
will vary in time. 
Even though migration is nowadays described as a strategy aimed at spreading risk 
(common in the ‘new economics of migration theory’), it often results in new vulnerabilities. 
There is a considerable group of migrants who – due to migration - suffered downward social 
mobility: they fell ill (malaria), were involved in an accident or became victims of robberies or 
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exploitation; well-educated women working as domestic servants will often not be able to fully 
exploit their capabilities. Another negative dimension of migration is the intensification of land 
conflicts and rising land prices (use of remittances for the purchase of land ). International 
migration – along with the liberalisation of land markets and the use of internet - has opened the 
door to a real estate boom. International migrants – and also tourism entrepreneurs – are 
increasingly appearing as a new category of absentee landowners.
Where attempts have been made by policymakers to maximise the positive impact of 
international migration or to restrict the negative implications, most of the sending countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa do not yet  have well-established policies. It is a new policy field and there is 
a wide variety of topics which very much depend on the particular position of countries. In our 
analysis (see 6) we showed that there is some overlap between the ‘migration and development’ 
agendas of northern and southern countries (increasing the flow of remittances, combating human 
trafficking, improving border controls, stimulating brain gain etc.) but this is very much 
dependent on the country under consideration, and that, within the South, there are considerable 
conflicts of interests between countries. We also showed that – where northern countries or 
donors invest in ‘migration and development’ programmes (MIDA/TOKTEN) - the number of 
beneficiaries is small in comparison with the total migration flow. From the perspective of the 
sending countries, it seems unrealistic to expect migrants to be willing to return as long as there 
are no comparable employment or educational opportunities. In many sending countries, the 
focus is not so much on ‘return’; instead, policymakers are searching for ‘long distance’ types of 
support by migrant populations. While they accept that people should have a right to move freely, 
they aim to get the diaspora involved by inviting them to send money or make investments. In 
general terms, in donor policies there is a bias in favour of countries with south-north migration 
and little is done for the countries experiencing south-south migration.
Recommendations
In order to improve the development impact of international migration and to make international 
migration more relevant to development, we have the following recommendations:
A. Improvement of current policies (supported by donors and northern countries):
· Anti-trafficking measures (programmes to stop the trafficking of women and children) 
should continue to receive high priority (supported by sending and receiving countries). 
At the same time, however, the sending countries are unhappy that victims and traffickers 
are treated equally as criminals. Priority should be given to stopping the criminalisation of 
the victims (and to focusing more on the traffickers). Legalisation of the victims is seen as 
an important requirement making anti-trafficking more effective.
· Anti-migration policies and/or intensification of border controls as a strategy for 
restricting illegal migration is not effective. Rather than investing in strengthening border 
controls (capacity building, technology etc.), more attention should be paid to problems of 
‘overstaying’.
· Where receiving countries show an interest in facilitating circular migration, it is 
necessary to examine critically previous experiences (guest worker programmes) and the 
development implications of current migration towards the Gulf States. The ageing 
population in Europe might offer opportunities for Africans on the European labour 
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market, but little is known about the particularities of future labour needs, and how such 
migration can help to promote essential productive investments and knowledge transfer. 
A better orientation towards the international labour market is needed if the country 
wishes to profit more from international migration. It is also important to anticipate better 
the growing competition between different migrant groups (how is it possible to guarantee 
that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa will be able in the long run to compete with 
migrants arriving from Asia and Latin America?). 
· It is recommended that an analysis be made of to what extent MIDA-TOKTEN initiatives 
(aimed at brain gain/ brain circulation) form part of mainstream development policies 
(PRSPs and sectoral plans), and analyse to what extent these are in conflict with 
‘traditional structures’. What is the capacity of local institutions to facilitate 
‘reintegration’ and or the return of people, and what is the impact of ‘foreign expertise’? 
What kind of institutional adaptations are necessary (e.g., property rights, inheritance 
rights etc.).Who is responsible for the people moving in and out, and what are the social 
security implications for these groups? What are their rights and obligations of circular 
migrants and who is responsible (the government of the sending or the receiving 
country)?
· Where support is given to migrant and diaspora organisations, it is important to also 
consider supporting such organisations in the countries of origin (e.g., in Burkina Faso 
there are numerous migrant organisations). Northern government and donors could 
continue to help migrant organisations to establish contacts with the area of origin, but 
also diaspora organisations in other countries, thus facilitating communication and 
information flows. (For more specific recommendations related to MOs in the 
Netherlands, see C.)
B. New orientations:
· Greater priority should be given to the problems of countries with South-South migration, 
and to those of transition areas/ migration hubs (how to improve the situation of transit 
migrants? In doing this, sufficient attention should be paid to the Asian-African (and 
potentially Latin American) connection.
· More emphasis should be given to supporting national governments and/or local groups 
(in sending countries) to establish links with their diaspora. Many sending countries are 
interested in intensifying relations with countries with substantial migrants group, but the 
financial means of their governments are limited. 
· More attention could be paid to the worldwide problem of discrimination and xenophobia 
(including in the South). Rather than continuing data collection –and deepening the 
contrast between how migrant and non migrant populations get along  (as is currently 
done by different donors), it is necessary to make a critical review of the paradigms used 
(aliens, 'immigrants', expats) and to assess how, in different countries, this categorisation 
contributes to stigmatisation, exclusion etc.
40
· More attention should be paid to the negative implications of the boom in bilateral 
agreements (readmission, migration quotas) for the intra-regional patterns of collaboration 
and/or interstate relations within the south.
· Given the growing interest in circular migration (see above), it would be interesting to 
collect more concrete information about how to monitor ‘urgent labour needs’ (not only 
in the North, but also within the South in relation to HIV-AIDS etc.). How can we match 
demand and supply, and make circular migration more relevant to African labour 
requirements?
· Priority should be given to providing more and better information to different categories 
of migrant groups. How can we inform migrants before their departure about the 
conditions in host countries; inform women and children so that they do not become 
victims of traffickers, AIDS and other diseases; inform people about visa requirements 
etc. (and the need to formalise their presence); economic investment possibilities; 
assessing the future labour needs; obtaining information about new laws and international 
treaties. etc.
· It is urgent to initiate a discussion about the new role of embassies and consulates – they 
are currently providing visas and passports, but what is their future role in distributing 
information (see above); in providing assistance in the case of emergencies and 
expulsions; in preparing agreements to improve social security etc?
· More attention should be paid to the problems of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 
refugees, in particular the ‘ecological refugees’ (together with political conflicts, one of 
the root causes of forced migration). Early warning systems and spatial planning could 
help to prevent forced migration.
· It is important to mainsteam ‘migration and development’ policies in the direction of anti-
poverty strategies. The current emphasis on ‘migration and development’ should not 
result in the reallocation of money in favour of the migrants. The majority of the 
population (97%) is geographically stable; they are quite reluctant to leave their homes 
and villages or towns. More explicit attention must be paid to how to control population 
growth and/or improve local employment opportunities, especially for the youth.
Suggestions for collaboration with the African diaspora in the Netherlands
(see van Naerssen et al 2006; and Kusters et al 2006):
* There are several hundreds of initiatives of Dutch civil society in the field of development 
cooperation with non-Western countries.  These NGOs are mostly locally or regionally based, 
their projects are small in scale and their funding sources diverse. The development-oriented 
African MOs fit into this pattern. Although they possess specific assets such as knowledge of 
foreign cultures and languages, there is no reason to give them a privileged position in 
development cooperation and acquiring funding. The major criterion for funding should be the 
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professional qualities of the those implementing and the quality of the project. The aim of 
development is not here, but there, in the home countries of the MOs.
* Migrants have a relative advantage by being rooted in more than one society. This 
‘transnationalism’ offers a huge potential for development cooperation. This potential should be 
exploited, and optimised by dialogue, information on funding opportunities, capacity building 
programmes etc. Special attention should be paid to the second generation of migrants (and how 
to keep them involved).
* African MOs in the Netherlands are small and greatly rely on volunteer work.  While 
acknowledging the value of the volunteer work, Dutch Development Cooperation agencies could 
facilitate and increase the quality of the work of MOs by organising training and exchange of 
experience sessions; and also by supporting MOs in the monitoring and evaluation of projects 
and programmes currently carried out in Africa. This should preferably be done by independent 
institutions (i.e. not linked to the funding agencies).
* During the past few years a dialogue has started between Dutch development agencies and 
MOs. Return migration and mostly small-scale projects are now on the agenda. The latter could 
be broadened by examining and encouraging social remittances, transnational entrepreneurship, 
private investments and tourism in countries of origin.  Special and careful attention should be 
paid to the opportunities for MOs to engage in programmes in the field of good governance and 
democratisation in the countries of origin. 
* African MOs could learn lessons from Asian and Latin American MOs, in particular, with 
regard to lobbying the African national governments for migrants’ rights and facilitating social 
remittances. Lessons could also be learned from existing initiatives and programmes in other 
European countries.
* Projects of MOs in all African countries should be considered for funding and other forms of 
support (i.e., not restricted to the partner countries). 
* Dutch CFAs and MOs should search for better ways of communication. It is a good thing that 
both sides acknowledge a certain field of tension in this engagement. Problems should be 
discussed at regular meetings, which could contribute to the diminution of mutual 
misunderstandings and to increasing the effectiveness of the programmes. More efforts need to 
be made to stimulate the learning process of working together.  
* The possibilities for ways of co-operation between Dutch development agencies, African MOs 
in the Netherlands and governments of the countries of origin should be explored and expanded. 
Apparent examples are the dialogues with the embassies of Ghana and Cape Verde. 
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Appendix 1: Suggestions for follow-up research
(in line with the policy recommendations):
1. Migration hubs and transit migration. 
We can conclude from our research that - especially in North Africa, but also in other areas -
some areas develop into migration hubs and have to deal with a large concentration of migrants -
often originating from neighbouring countries - who do not settle to stay, but are intending to 
make the ‘final jump’ to Europe as soon as they have made the necessary arrangements and 
collected sufficient money. Many of these migrants seem to live in extreme vulnerability, being 
excluded from two sides: they are no longer considered citizens in their areas of origin (they have 
tried to shed their old identities), but are also not accepted as citizens in the area of destination. 
They are not under protection and are ‘footloose’ with respect to institutional support systems. 
Policy formulation in this field (how to deal with transit migrants and transition areas) is 
necessary in order to protect this category of people, who often do not have the possibility to 
return – nor are they able to move on. This research will also focus on how migrants perceive the 
pros and cons of different migration destinations (reputation of the Netherlands and other EU 
countries as destination areas). Attention should also be paid to the new Asia-Africa connection 
and the role of Africa as transition area for Asian migrants moving to the EU/ US.
Selection of research location and implementation in collaboration with Prof. Aderanti Adepoju, 
preferably at various locations simultaneously.
2. Migration as a booming business': 
New types of services and economic activities related to migration, in the areas of origin and 
destination. Migration is currently a ‘booming business in the sense of generating new types of 
services and economic activities, facilitating the communication between areas of origin and 
destination (internet cafés, couriers, financial services), but also contributing to import and export 
business, including tourism. Parts of these new economic activities are transnational and help to 
strengthen transnational relations. In the discussion on international migration, little is known 
about the economic significance of migration-related activities, and their contribution to business 
development, economic innovation and, lastly, national development. This research will result in 
a better understanding of the economic impact of international migration, and the selective way in 
which the benefits are distributed between the areas of origin and destination (what areas receive 
the most favourable impact?). To what extent does international migration generate impulses for 
new economic activities; what are the consequences in terms of complementarities, dependency 
and competition? Special attention will be paid to the link between tourism and migration.
Research location:s Amsterdam, Madrid, sub-Saharan Africa (to be selected)
3. The image and reputation of various EU-countries as areas of destination
Currently, many people from sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America move towards EU 
countries, and there is a clear diversification in the range of migration destinations. Whereas 
people previously showed a preference for the colonial ‘motherland, today they migrate to a wide 
range of possible destinations. Different countries have different reputations in respect of 
possibilities for getting work, and also in regard to discrimination, and the possibilities for being 
accepted as full member of civil society and/or family reunification. Some countries are seen as 
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the ideal destination – and other areas are perceived only as transition areas (Somalis leave the 
Netherlands, for example, and migrate to the UK). The Netherlands is not only a final destination, 
but also a transition area and migration hub.
This research will contribute to a better understanding of image-forming (how do people assess 
the opportunities at different destinations); what is the image of migrating to different 
destinations and what kind of expectations do people have? To what extent do we see differences 
between the migrants and the stayers; how do migrants and ‘stayers’ communicate (email, 
telephone etc.) and to what extent is there a gap between image, expectation and reality; how 
does this influence migration decisions? Special attention will be paid to the expectation that, as a 
consequence of their ageing population, EU countries are in need of migrant labour, especially in 
the field of medical care.
4. Migrants as competitors and rivals
As a consequence of increasing migration, there is an increasing heterogeneity of different 
migrant populations. In addition to groups of expatriates who have become fully integrated and 
full citizens in the destination areas, there are migrants who are currently coming in search of 
work or in the framework of family reunification, or to obtain political asylum. In addition to this 
kind of diversity (based on the purpose of migration), there is an important distinction between 
the different generations. The various EU countries use different definitions of the above 
categories, which has important implications for their development possibilities.
This research aims to contribute to a better understanding of the heterogeneity of migrants and, 
more particularly, of the extent to which this is translated into patterns of competition and/or 
solidarity. In order to have a better idea about whether international migration from sub-Saharan 
Africa will contribute to sustainable development in the long run, it is extremely important to 
have a clear idea about how different groups of migrants compete – and the extent in which 
African migrants are capable of defending themselves against the arrival of migrants from Asia 
or Latin America. To what extent do migrants from different areas of origin have their own 
‘niches’, how do they compete and what are the consequences for their capacity to build 
sustainable livelihoods? What are the urgent labour needs (not only in EU countries, but also in 
SSA), what are the varying abilities of different groups to benefit? How are migrant groups 
stigmatised and how does this influence their position on the labour market? How do recruiters 
deal with the strengths and weaknesses of different migrant groups, and what are the 
implications?
Research location: The Netherlands-Spain
5. Embassies, diplomatic relations and the institutionalisation of migration
International migration has important implications for diplomatic relations between the countries 
of origin and destination. More than in previous times, embassies fulfil a role for civil society –
they have a responsibility in providing citizens with visa and passports. At the same time, 
however, many countries have developed into diasporic states with immense populations 
overseas; it is only relatively recently that national states have become interested in establishing 
closer links with this expatriate population and using this potential as a motor for the 
development of the mother state.
Governments are taking the initiative in establishing ‘ministries of the diaspora’ as a way of 
involving the diaspora in national development. The contact between embassies and the diaspora 
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is often very limited - there is often a lack of trust – and the range of services tends to be limited 
(visas, passports etc.). 
This research will focus on the following questions: What are the implications of international 
migration for the role of embassies and how do they respond to the need for new services? What 
is their role in the establishment of bilateral agreements (EU - sub-Saharan Africa) and what are 
the consequences for diplomatic relations? How does international migration affect diplomatic 
relations? How can embassies and consulates play a positive role in providing necessary 
information and facilitating communication?
Research location: visiting several embassies (Bolivia and Ecuador, Philippines, China, Ghana, 
Senegal, Burkina Faso).
6. International migration, land speculation/ foreign-fundia and land titling
International migration will – as a result of sending remittances - will often result in land 
speculation, rising land princes and, in some cases, even a real-estate boom. Because of the lack 
of alternative investment opportunities, migrant remittances are often used for the purchase of 
land (even at a long distance; migrants often do not return). This is leading increasingly to the 
existence of foreign-fundia (land owned by foreigners, as a new type of absentee ownership); 
people in northern countries, including tourist operators, buy large tracts of land, which they use 
for building homes, and also hotels or tourist estates. Recent processes of land privatisation, 
Internet communication – and migration – are contributing to a real-estate boom, and this is 
reflected in rising land prices. 
At the same time, donors are investing large amounts of money in projects aimed at the cadastral 
registration of land. It is not so clear to what extent land titling and cadastral projects can help to 
control above trends, nor is it clear whether land titling programmes are sufficiently focused on 
dealing with the consequences of migration.  What are the implications of land titling for circular 
migration? Is there a need for more flexible types of land ownership (renting, leasing, etc.), given 
the importance of flexible international migration? How do land titling programmes deal with 
‘mobile’ populations? What kind of property regime is most appropriate, given the high 
population mobility? What are the implications of migration for inheritance legislation? What are 
the consequences of international migration for land speculation and absenteeism?
Research location: To be defined, in an area with strong migration.
7. Migrant and diaspora organisations (in relation to civil society)
Increasing emphasis is being placed in current policy on migrant and diaspora organisations in 
the Netherlands. Less attention is usually paid to the organisations in the countries of origin 
(organisations established by returned migrants etc.). The problem of diaspora and migrant 
organisations, however, is that they are often representative bodies and may have little expertise 
relevant to development. How can these organisations be used to stimulate development in the 
area of origin in such a way that it forms part of mainstream development policies and respects 
‘local’ priorities (participatory approach).  
Research location: to be determined.
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Appendix 2: Ideas for PhD projects 
The following PhD projects form part of the ongoing research programme ‘Global Mobility and 
Place’, which will be carried out as part of the Humboldt programme of Human Development. 
The projects are approved projects, but implementation depends on the possibilities for co-
financing. Candidates need to be selected in the course of 2007. 
Project 1: International Migration and European Borders.
This project will start at the macro level by making a comparative analysis of migration flows at 
the European ports of entry, focusing on people arriving from Latin America, Asia and Africa. 
Research will concentrate on questions such as where do people enter and why, the influence of 
changing or varying border and immigration policies, and the role of borders, institutions and 
sources of information. At the micro level, the project will analyse the migrants’ active role in 
searching for the loopholes at the EU borders, and their responses to different institutional 
settings. What is the rationality or irrationality of migration and bordering practices, and what are 
their consequences? What is the significance of borders for highly skilled and unskilled labour? 
What is the link between border regimes and legalisation statelessness?
Key words: migration flows (highly skilled versus unskilled); border regimes and immigration 
policies; information flows and perceptions. 
Research location: EU ports of entry/departure ports in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Project 2: Migration and Home: settlement and removal in the EU.
During recent  decades, EU countries have adopted different attitudes on how to deal with 
different groups of immigrants. Depending upon their location and also their labour needs, the 
various countries have adopted different policies with respect to settlement and integration. This 
project aims to make a comparative analysis of settlement and removal in different countries of 
the EU. Attention will be paid to the influence of the various institutional settings on how 
migrants seek attachment to place and the creation of locality. How do we deal with designations 
such as alien or guest in relation to how people link to places?
Key words: settlement/ removal, identity, attachment to place, creation of locality; citizenship.
Research location: comparative research in a selection of EU countries.
Project 3: Migration and Transnational Networks: diasporas within the EU, new networks 
and the impact for development. 
The EU is home of different diasporas: large numbers of migrants from Latin America, Asia and 
Africa maintain contacts with their home countries. Nowadays, governments from their home 
countries plan to use these diasporas because they send home remittances or are potential sources 
of investment in their countries of origin. This project will analyse the role of diasporas in the 
creation of global and local linkages, and focus on the question of how to make diasporas more 
beneficial for development? Attention will be paid to the two sides (the EU and the sending 
economy). Key words: diasporas, networks, flows of capital, goods and information, 
development
Research location: specific migrant groups, focusing on external networks.
46
References
(References to project output are mentioned in the text; additional references are mentioned in the 
footnotes)
Abad, L.V., Z. Aragall et al. (2005). Codesarollo: Migraciones y desarrollo mundial. Madrid. CIDEAL.
Adams, R.H. & J. Page (2003). International Migration, Remittances and Poverty in Developing Countries. Poverty 
Reduction Group Working Paper 3179. Washington: World Bank
Adepoju, A. (1974). Migration and Socio-Economic Links Between Urban Migrants and their Home
Communities in Nigeria. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 44(4), 383-396.
Adepoju, A. (2000). Issues and Recent Trends in International Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa.
International Social Science Journal, 52.
Adepoju, A. (2002); Fostering free movement of persons in West Africa: Achievements, constraints, and prospects 
for Intraregional migration. In: International Migration, Vol. 40 (2), 2002. Blackwell publishers, Oxford. 
Adepoju, A. (2004). Changing Configurations of Migration in Africa. Migration Information
Source. http://www.migrationinformation.com/Feature/display.cfm?ID=251
Adepoju, A. (2006). Perspective on international migration and national development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(keynote). Paper presented at the experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
Adepoju, A. van Naerssen, T and A. Zoomers (2006). Proceedings of the experts’ meeting. International migration 
and national development: Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. Working papers Migration 
and Development series,  Report No. 2. Nijmegen.
Akologo, S.Z. (2005). The Role of Diaspora-based Organizations in Socio-Economic Development at the Local 
Level in Ghana. In: Takyiwaa Manuh (red.) At Home in the World? International  Migration and Development in 
Contemporary Ghana and West Africa.  Accra. Institute of African Studies/UNDP, pp. 335-350. 
Altamirano, T. (2006). Peruvian highland indigenous sheepherders in USA. A case study. Paper presented at the 
experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 
2006. 
Black, R, S. Ammassari, S. Mouillesseaux and R. Rajkotia (2004) . Migration and Pro-Poor Policy in West Africa.
Working Paper C8. University of Sussex: DRC on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty.
Baggio, F. (2006). Migration and development in the Philippines. Paper presented at the experts’ meeting 
‘International migration and national development. Radboud University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
Beauchemin, Ch, B.Schoumaker & S.Henry (2005). Côte d’Ivoire – Burkina Faso (1970-2000) : une etude 
retrospective des determinants individuels et contextuels du retour. Paper presented in Tours IUSSP congress 2005.
Bomboma, D. (2006). African migration profile change and co-development policy. Paper presented at the experts’ 
meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
Broekhuis, A. (2006). International migration and development in Burkina Faso, viewpoints and policy initiatives. 
Working papers Migration and Development series. Report No. 7. Nijmegen.
47
Broekhuis, A. and Ndione  B. (2006). Migration international et développement. Points de vue et initiatives au 
Sénégal. Working papers Migration and Development series. Report No. 8. Nijmegen.
Carling, J. (2005). Trafficking in Women from Nigeria to Europe. Migration Information Source.
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=318
Collyer, M. (2006). Undocumented Subsaharan African Migrants in Morocco. In: N. Nyberg Sorensen (ed.) 
Mediterranean Transit Migation, 129-145. Copenhagen: Danish Insitute for International Studies (DIIS).
Commission of the European Communities  (2003). Communication from the Commission on Immigration, 
Integration and Employment. Brussels 3.6.2003, COM (2003) 336. 
CONAPO (2006). Etude sur la situation et les conditions de vie des rapatries : de l’insecurité à la pauvreté ? Rapport 
Final. Ministère de l’Economie et du Développement, Conseil National pour la Population.
de Haan, A. (2005). "Migration in the Development Studies Literature: has it come out of Marginality?" Paper 
presented at the UNU-WIDER Jubilee Conference WIDER Thinking ahead: the Future of Development Economics, 
17-18 June 2005, Helsinki, Finland.
de Haas, H. (2003). Migration and Development in Southern Morocco: The Disparate Socio-Economic Impacts of 
Out-Migration on the Todgha Oasis Valley. Rotterdam: Optima.
de Haas, H. (2006). Engaging Diasporas. How Governments and Development Agencies can support Diaspora 
Involvement in the Development of Origin Countries. A Study for Oxfam Novib. Den Haag. 
de Haas, H.  (2006). International migration and development Nigeria. Working papers Migration and Development 
series, Report No. 6. Nijmegen.
Donhof, D. (2005). Going in Circles? An Intergenerational Approach to Circular Migration Between the Netherlands 
and Cape Verde. Master thesis, Faculty of Spatial Sciences ,University of Groningen
Ehindero, S.; O. Awolowo and P. Idemudia (2006). Baseline Study on Forced Labour and
Human Trafficking in Kwara, Kano, Cross Rivers and Lagos State in Nigeria. Abuja: ILO/PATWA
Offices in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia.
Farrant, M., A. MacDonald,  D. Sriskandarajah (2006). Migration and Development: Opportunities and Challenges 
for Policymakers. Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM). IOM Migration Research Series no. 22.  
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR).
Fawcett, J.T. (1989). "Networks, Linkages and Migration Systems". International Migration Review 23: 671-680. 
Gavazzo, N. (2006). Migrations as factors of cultural development. The case of Argentina. Paper presented at the 
experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 
2006. 
Germana, C. et al. (2005). La Migracion Internacional. El Caso Peruano. Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Facultad de 
Ciencias Sociales (UNMSM).
Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (2005). Migration in an Interconnected World: New 
Directons for Action. Report of the Global Commision on International migration. Geneva:GCIM.
Golo, K. H. (2006). Reflections on migration and child trafficking in Ghana: The role of Ghana’s poverty reduction 
strategies. Paper presented at the experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
48
Gwebu,  T.D. (2006). Contemporary patterns, trends and development implications of international migration from 
Botswana.Paper presented at the experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
Horst, C. (2006) . Transnational Nomads. How Somalis cope with Refugee Life in the Dadaab Camps of Kenya.. 
Oxford. Berghahn Books.
Hernandez-Coss, R., C. Eguagu and M. Josefsson (2006) The UK-Nigeria Remittance Corridor. DfID. Forthcoming.
Jackson, P ; P. Crang and C. Dwyer (2004). Transnational Spaces. London: Routledge.
Jones, R.C. (1992). "US Migration: An Alternative Economic Mobiliy Ladder for Rural Central Mexico". Social 
Science Quaterly, 73 (3): 496-510.
Kabunda Badi, M. (2006). Los flujos migratorios: el caso de la inmigracion africana. Paper presented at the experts’ 
meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
Kusters, J; R. Plug; J. Schapendonk and T. van Naerssen (2006). Een inventarisatie van Afrikaanse 
migrantenorganisaties in Nederland betrokken bij ontwikkelingssamenwerking.Working papers Migration and 
Development series, Report No.13. Nijmegen
Leung, M. (2006). Overseas Chinese as agents for Economic Development in China. Paper presented at the experts’ 
meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
Lucas, R.E.B. (2004). "International Migration regimes and Economic Development". Report prepared for the Expert 
Group on Development Issues (EGDI) in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Maas, M. (2005). Transnational Entrepreneurship: Exploring Determinants ands Impacts of a Dutch-based Filipino 
Immigrant Business. Asian and Pacific migration Journal, vol. 14,, 169-191.
Mafukidze, J. (2006). A Discussion on Migration and Migration Patterns and Flows in Africa. In: Cross C., D. 
Gelderblom, N. Roux, J. Mafukidze (eds) (2006). Views on Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. Proceedings of an 
African Migration Alliance Workshop, 103-129. Capetown: HSRC Press.
Manuh, T. (2006). Migration from Africa. Challenges, opportunities and policy responses (key note). Paper 
presented at the experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud University Nijmegen, 
August 23-24, 2006. 
Marchand, M. (2006). The new Heroes and Heroines of North America. Migrants and their development potential. 
Paper presented at the experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
Messina, A.M & G. Lahav (eds) (2006). The Migration Reader. Exploring Politics and Policies. London: Lynne 
Rienner publishers.
Mohamoud, A. (2006). Social Remittances in the African Diasporas in Europe. The case study of the Netherlands. 
Paper presented at the experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud University 
Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
Muhoza, D. and P. Rutayisire (2006). Migration Internationale et Développement National: Points de vue du 
Rwanda. Working papers Migration and Development series, Report No.9. Nijmegen.
Netherlands Embassy, Dakar (2005) . Illegale migratie in West Afrika; met detailstudie Senegal en Mauritanië. 
Unpublished report.
49
Ngoie Tshibambe, G. (2006). Beyond remittances: Diaspora’s Congolese and the post-conflict rebuilding of the 
D.R.C. Paper presented at the experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud 
University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
NNPC (2004). Meeting Everyone’s Needs: National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy.
Abuja: Nigerian National Planning Commission.
Office of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006), Trafficking in Persons Report, U.S. 
Department of State Publication.
Oucho, J.O. (2006). African brain drain and gain, diapora and remittances: more rhetoric than action persists in 
countries of origin. Paper presented at the experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. 
Radboud University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
Portes, A. (1996). Globalization from Below: the Rise of Transnational Communities. In:W.P. Smith & R.P. 
Korczenwicz. Latin America in the World Economy, 151-168. West Port, CN: Greenwood Press.
Raghuram, P. (2006). Conceptualising Indian Emigration. The development story. Paper presented at the experts’ 
meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud University Nijmegen, August 23-24, 2006. 
Raimundo, I. (2006). Migration management: how does Mozambique go through challenges and strategies. Paper
presented at the experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud University Nijmegen, 
August 23-24, 2006. 
Rutten, M. and K.Muli (2006). International migration and development in Kenya. Working papers Migration and 
Development series, Report No.10. Nijmegen.
Sheffer, G. (2003). Diaspora Politics. At Home Abroad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skeldon, R. (1990). Population Mobility in Developing Countries: A reinterpretation. London: Bellhaven Press.
Soulama, T. (2005). La legislation relative à la migration de main d’œuvre au Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou : 
OIT/Union Européenne : projet OIT-UE RAF/02/M12/EEc, Migration de main d’œuvre pour l’intégration et le 
développement en Afrique de l’Ouest.
Spaan, E. and D. van Moppes.(2006). African exodus? Trends and patterns of international migration in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Working papers Migration and Development series, Report No. 4. Nijmegen.
UN General Assembly (2006). International Migration and Development, report of the Secretary-General. New 
York. United Nations. Sixtieth session, Agenda item 54 c Globalization and interdependence: international migration 
and development.
UNFPA (2004). Global and Regional Migration Policies. Recent Developments towards Strengthening International 
Co-operation on Migration. A Paper Prepared by the Internatonal Migration Policy Porgramme (IMP) for its 
Regional Meetings with Senior Government Officials.
UNFPA (2006). United Nations Population Fund: www.unfpa.org
Usher, E. (2005)..The Milennium Development Goals and Migration. Geneva: International Organization for 
Migration.
van Heelsum, A. (2005).Database van Afrikaanse organisaties. Amsterdam. IMES. 
van Heelsum, A. (2006) . Afrikanen uit Angola, DR Congo, Ethiopië, Eritrea, Nigeria en Soedan in Nederland, een 
profiel. The Hague. Ministry of Justice.
50
van Moppes D; J. Schapendonk; J. Kusters and M. van der Veen (2006). Summary of the discussions of the experts’ 
meeting: International migration and national development. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of 
origin. 23-24 August 2006. Working papers Migration and Development series, Report No. 3. Nijmegen.
van Moppes, D.  (2006). The African migration movement: Routes to Europe. Working papers Migration and 
Development series, Report No. 5. Nijmegen
van Naerssen, T.; E. Spaan and F. Hillmann (2005). Asian Migrants and European Labour Market. London: 
Routledge.
van Naerssen, T.; J. Kusters and J. Schapendonk (2006). Afrikaanse migrantenorganisaties in Nederland. 
Ontwikkelingsactiviteiten en opinies over ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Working papers Migration and Development 
series, Report No.12. Nijmegen
van der Veen, M. (2006). Een inventarisatie van migratiebeleid volgens de NederlandseAmbassades in Sub-Sahara 
Afrika, het belang van migratie in PRSPs, en een overzicht van belangrijke beleidsdocumenten
Working papers Migration and Development series,. Report No.11. Nijmegen
Wabgou, M. (2006). The transnational Senegalese Community. Migrants’ contributions to development. Paper 
presented at the experts’ meeting ‘International migration and national development. Radboud University Nijmegen, 
August 23-24, 2006. 
World Bank (2003). Global Development Finance Report 2003. Washington. 
World Bank (2006).Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration, IBRD, 
Washington DC.
Zlotnik, H. (1992). Empirical Identification of International Migration Systems. In: M.Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik 
(eds). International Migration Systems: a Global Approach, 19-40. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Zoomers, A. and T.van Naerssen (2006). Proposal and working programme: International migration and national 
development. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. Working papers Migration and 
Development series,  Report No. 1. Nijmegen
Zoomers, A. (2006). Op zoek naar eldorado. Over internationale migratie, sociale mobiliteit en ontwikkeling. 
Inaugurele rede. Radboud Univesiteit 28 september 2006.
Zourkaléini, Y. (2005). Les déterminants individuelles et contextuels des migrations internationales au Burkina Faso. 
Paper presented at IUSSP Conférence in Tours (France).
51
Working papers Migration and Development series
(Radboud University Nijmegen, Migration and Development research group, Department of 
Human Geography), reports 1-15.
Zoomers, A. and T.van Naerssen (2006). Proposal and working programme: International migration and national 
development. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. Working papers Migration and 
Development series,  Report No. 1. Nijmegen.
Adepoju, A. van Naerssen, T and A. Zoomers (2006). Proceedings of the experts’ meeting. International migration 
and national development: Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. Working papers Migration 
and Development series,  Report No. 2. Nijmegen.
van Moppes D;  J. Schapendonk; J. Kusters and M. van der Veen (2006). Summary of the discussions of the experts’ 
meeting: International migration and national development. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of 
origin. 23-24 August 2006. Working papers Migration and Development series, Report No. 3. Nijmegen.
Spaan, E. and D. van Moppes.(2006). African exodus? Trends and patterns of international migration in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Working papers Migration and Development series, Report No. 4. Nijmegen.
van Moppes, D.  (2006). The African migration movement: Routes to Europe. Working papers Migration and 
Development series, Report No. 5. Nijmegen.
de Haas, H.  (2006). International migration and development Nigeria. Working papers Migration and Development 
series, Report No. 6. Nijmegen
Broekhuis, A. (2006). International migration and development in Burkina Faso, viewpoints and policy initiatives. 
Working papers Migration and Development series. Report No. 7. Nijmegen.
Broekhuis, A. and Ndione  B. (2006). Migration international et développement. Points de vue et initiatives au 
Sénégal. Working papers Migration and Development series. Report No. 8. Nijmegen.
Muhoza, D. and P. Rutayisire (2006). Migration Internationale et Développement National: Points de vue du 
Rwanda. Working papers Migration and Development series, Report No.9. Nijmegen.
Rutten, M. and K.Muli (2006). International migration and development in Kenya. Working papers Migration and 
Development series, Report No.10. Nijmegen.
van der Veen, M. (2006). Een inventarisatie van migratiebeleid volgens de NederlandseAmbassades in Sub-Sahara 
Afrika, het belang van migratie in PRSPs, en een overzicht van belangrijke beleidsdocumenten
Working papers Migration and Development series,. Report No.11. Nijmegen
van Naerssen, T.; J. Kusters and J. Schapendonk (2006). Afrikaanse migrantenorganisaties in Nederland. 
Ontwikkelingsactiviteiten en opinies over ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Working papers Migration and Development 
series, Report No.12. Nijmegen.
Kusters,  J; R. Plug;  J. Schapendonk and T. van Naerssen (2006). Een inventarisatie van Afrikaanse 
migrantenorganisaties in Nederland betrokken bij ontwikkelingssamenwerking.Working papers Migration and 
Development series, Report No.13. Nijmegen.
52
Zoomers, A. and T. van Naerssen (2006) Final report: International migration and national development in sub-
Saharan Africa. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin.Working papers Migration and 
Development series, Report No.14. Nijmegen.
Zoomers A. (ed.) (2006) Executive summary: International migration and national development in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin.Working papers Migration and Development 
series, Report No.15. Nijmegen.
